
5 971.05
W 588 Lc 3





BIBLIOTHEQVE
SAINT-SVLPICE MONTREAL

INC
Sm1.07F3
1988

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2015

https://archive.org/details/lettersofveritas00rich

THE LETTERS OF

VERITAS,

RE-PUBLISHED FROM THE

MONTREAL HERALD;

CONTAINING

A SUCCINCT NARRATIVE OF THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION OF

SIR GEORGE PREVOST,

DURING HIS COMMAND IN

THE CANADAS;

WHEREBY IT WILL APPEAR MANIFEST, THAT THE MERIT OF PRESERVING THEM FROM CONQUEST,

BELONGS NOT TO HIM.

MONTREAL.

PRINTED BY W. GRAY.

JULY, 1815.

VERITAS

OR

A Collection of Papers published in the MONTREAL HERALD, (Canada.)

To the Editor of the Montreal Herald

SIR,

THE *delusions which have for some time been practised upon the public, have become of late so gross, that it becomes a duty to attempt to counteract their effects, especially as they are intended to deceive people at a distance; particularly in Great Britain, as to the late and present state of this Country.*

The last addresses from this place and Quebec to His Excellency SIR GEORGE PREVOST, *are so fulsome and false, that they appear to offer a challenge to any man armed with a pen, who shall dare to oppose or expose the sentiments therein expressed.*

That Challenge, feeble as any pen is, I accept, on

16235

on behalf of all the inhabitants of the Canadas who may value their permanent safety and welfare, more than time serving interests; and truth and independance, more than misrepresentation and servility.

In consequence, I hereby pledge myself, by a simple narrative of SIR GEORGE'S *administration, civil and military, bottomed upon plain but undisguised facts, (for truth shall be my guide, however unpalatable to some it may be) to prove that the public is grossly imposed upon; that Sir* GEORGE, *neither by his foresight, conciliation, example, or impulse, called forth the energies of the militia of either Province; and that the merit of preserving them from conquest belongs not to him.*

Finally, that he has left the people of this Province, far more seriously divided in sentiment than he found them.

Montreal had the honor of giving the first impulse in Lower Canada, towards a determined resistance of the enemy. Let us endeavour also to have the honor of exposing falsehood, and bringing back the people to the exercise of their sound political senses.

I shall begin, Mr. Editor, next week, to occupy some of your columns, chiefly with Sir George's military conduct, and continue in your succeeding Heralds, until I have gone through what I propose.

All the favor I entreat is, that instead of abuse, I may be met in the fair field of argument and matter of fact. "VERITAS."

Montreal, 7th April, 1815.

To the Editor of the Montreal Herald

[No. I.]

SIR,

IN pursuance of my promise, I now proceed, by a plain relation of facts, to expose the deceptions that have been so unremittingly practised, with a view to impose upon His Majesty's Government, and our fellow subjects at a distance, by attempting to erect Sir George Prevost into an Idol of adoration, that every one was to fall down and worship, or submit to be branded as factions and disaffected.

Many of different sentiments would silently have allowed the matter to pass over, had there been any kind of decency or measure in the incense offered ; but the Addreſſes have of late been so fulsome, and so devoid of truth, that the most torpid who feel for the honor of their country, must be roused to offer their reasons for refusing to join the idolatrous, in this new species of political worship.

Another powerful motive impels me to come forward on this occasion, which is to endeavor to prevent the stream of materials for the history of the late war, from being polluted by the deleterious mixtures of falsehood and misrepresentation, which panders and sycophants are infusing therein.

Such a proceeding may possibly, by some, be

called libellous, but what I mean to write cannot be a libel, unleſs historic truth be such. Accusations however of that description, will come with a bad grace from those who have systematically framed and circulated a series of the most grievous calumnies and libels against the memory of Sir James Craig, and these under the sanction of Sir George Prevost, inasmuch as may be fairly inferred, from his receiving an Addreſs from a former House of Aſſembly, stuffed with groſs abuse of his predeceſſor in office, and praise of himself; which he swallowed without remark or reproof:—and also as may be inferred, from the countenance given at Head Quarters to *that miserable Paper the Spectateur*, which appears to have been set up at first, and to be continued for no other purpose than to vent calumny and abuse against Sir Jas. Craig, both Councils of this Province, and almost every respectable character in the community; whilst it heaped upon Sir George Prevost, the most servile adulation, bottomed upon falsehood.

The war being over, the language of truth can be fearlesly used, without injury to the safety and interests, as in future they cannot be affected by a discuſſion of the question, whether Sir George's merits as to the past, have been over-rated or not.

Notwithstanding we had for years before, been threatened with war by the United States, yet Sir George having entered upon the exercise of

his

his functions, apparently with a determination to act contrary to his predeceſſor in every thing; and Sir James Craig having unfortunately employed one Henry, who proved a traitor, to procure intelligence of the then designs of the American Government against this country; Sir George would employ none, and took no precaution whatever to get information, even of the war when declared. Mr. Foſter our wise Minister at Washington, sent notice of the declaration of war; it is true, but by a chance conveyance to New-York, to be forwarded from thence to Lower-Canada, by some safe accidental hand, *no doubt to save expence*, and it arrived at Montreal several weeks afterwards. To Upper Canada he sent no notice at all. The want of intelligence of the enemy's military designs and movements, has been so notorious throughout the war, that I shall pointedly touch thereon hereafter.

Happily individual diligence and zeal made up for these gross and unpardonable neglects. The war was known at Montreal and at Queenston in Upper Canada by private expreſſes, in six days after its declaration at Washington, and at Quebec and York, the seats of Government, in twenty four hours more.

Some of those about Head Quarters, doubted the intelligence, and considered it some mercantile speculation; but upon re-consideration, they were thrown into the other extreme, and fell into such a state of alarm as is now scarcely credible,

credible, and which the subjects of it would be glad to have buried in oblivion—for really from the Chateau downwards, *the first impulse with many at Quebec*, was to push off their wives and families to England, as *it* must soon be besieged.

Fortunately it was otherwise at Montreal; for here the first impreſſion was, to remain at our posts and prepare for their defence—hence the flank and artillery companies of the first or Engliſh Battalion of Town Militia, of their own mere motion (before orders or arms were iſſued to them) instantly began to exercise in marching onthe C hamp de Mars, every morning at 5, and every evening at 6 o'clock. They continued after they got arms, with great perseverance and diligence to learn the use of them, and being joined by another company of that Battalion, became afterwards Embodied Volunteers, active and zealous in defence of the Country.

The flank companies of the Canadian Town Militia, to their praise be it spoken, soon after caught the example, and followed it; whilst in the country the common language then was, *nous resterons tranquiles chez nous*, or *nous marcherons tous ensemble*, which in plain Engliſh are pretty synonimus. The town Sedentary Militia were not tardy in following the example of their flank companies, and the Champ de Mars for the whole Summer of 1812, actually resembled a be hive, from the multitudes actively employed upon it, in learning military exercises.

The

The month before the war, there had been a draft of Militia to be embodied for three months, which occasioned great discontents over the Province, and which in the Country Parishes of this Island broke out into open violence; at Nouvelle Beauce, and at Pointe aux Trembles, near Quebec, it was nearly as bad.

It was strongly suspected, that this discontment was fomented by some of those, now the staunch advocates of Sir George Prevost. Be this as it may, it is certain that not one of his now self called friends and favourites, stepped forward to undeceive their countrymen, and preach submission to the laws; for after an opposition by some of the refractory, to a party sent to apprehend Militia Deserters, a multitude from the country Parishes assembled at Pointe Claire and La Chine, about a week after the war was known; some in arms, and all determined to go to La Prairie, where the Militia Drafts were, and bring them away in triumph.

Whilst this was in progress, Sir George was on his way from Quebec, and before he arrived, or could possibly be consulted, decision became necessary. Accordingly a Committee of the Executive Council resident here, lost not a moment in sending out a mission to reason with the tumultuous and warn them of their fate, if they persisted in their conduct and designs; and which mission to give it due effect, was immediately followed by a detachment of troops and artillery furnished by Generel Vincent, as he said,

said, upon the requisition of the said Committee; a magistrate was also sent to accompany the military force. The members of that mission, the said magistrate, as also some Gentlemen of their own accord, from the impulse of humanity, did their utmost by reasoning, to persuade the insurgents, whom they met at La Chine on their way to La Prairie, to disperse, but without effect.—They persisted, and became so insolent, that the application of the military force sent out became indispensable; but it was applied with great forbearance and humanity by Lt. Col. Plenderleath, 49th Regt. who commanded; and only one man fell a sacrifice, although some returned the fire of the troops.

Next morning all the flank companies of the Town Militia, after being armed, marched out to the assistance of the troops, whom they joined at La Chine, and the whole united, marched on to Pointe Claire. The insurgents retired from La Chine in the night preceding, and learning what was passing, now dispersed. Detachments were sent out from Pointe Claire, and some of the most forward of the Insurgents were apprehended, whilst others were notified to come to town and surrender, or abide the consequences.

The day after this, the troops and town militia marched back by another road in triumph, and a proud triumph it was to the latter, and to their immortal honor, to have aided in showing the refractory, that there was a power to punish,

as

as well as protect ; and further by their example, to have contributed in bringing back their countrymen to a ſenſe of their duty ; as from that moment matters took quite a different turn.

But who will pretend to decide, what the extent of the effect of a contrary example on that critical occaſion might have been ; or even had the Town Militia remained indifferent Spectators ; or had the Committee of Council been leſs prompt in their meaſures, or had they waited to conſult the Governor. In either of theſe poſſible caſes, the infection of inſurrection might have ſpread like wild fire, and Pointe Claire and Nouvelle Beauce, been joined together by the intermediate pariſhes ; for the multitude of every country is giddy, and there are always ſelf ſtyled Patriots ready to blow the coals. I ſhudder to think of it, but thank God, inſtead of this, Sir George (who had no hand whatever in bringing about this happy change) had only to come and thank the town militia on their return, and next day to receive the ſubmiſſion of the late leading inſurgents, ſeveral of whom were committed, tried, and convicted.

Sir George gave one of his Parliamentary friends (when he waited upon him at the Government Houſe, Montreal, on that occaſion) a moſt violent philippic, for his double dealing in the buſineſs ; but he has been ſince re-admitted into the corps of puffers of his pretended ſame—whilſt thoſe who at that time were the means

means of saving him and the Province, and at all times have been foremost in giving the example of a determination to resist the enemy, are calumniated as a faction, because they are non-adorers. Those who are now his bosom friends, are many of them men (who to say no worse) stirred not one step in the day of need, to give an example to their refractory countrymen—but who were ready after the impulse was given to profit by it so far, as to *condescend* to accept of lucrative situations in the militia, some of whom however soon resigned, when they found that such situations were not to be sinecures.

Now let it be borne in mind, that the discontents above said about the militia drafts, originated from an act passed and executed during Sir George's own administration. Here, then was a fine opportunity for demonstrating by *deeds*, instead of *words*, the devotion of the Canadian population to their political idol, and of his great influence over them, but nothing was seen or felt of either, until after the active example of the English at that alarming crisis, had produced the happy change which ensued; and which change has enabled his satellites (carefully concealing the cause) by falsehoods and misrepresentations, to make such use of it, in the endless addresses manufactured since, with a view to impose upon people at a distance, who do not know the real state of the case.— Surely it cannot be supposed, that Sir George was so negligent

gent of his duty at ſuch a criſis, as not to have uſed his influence, if he had any; but whether he did uſe it or not, is for him and his friends to ſettle.—All we know is, that there were no viſible uſeful effects of it, at that alarming period.

There is a piece of hiſtory about the Militia Act which ſhould be had in remembrance.—The leaders in the then Aſſembly, now warm friends of Sir George, got a clauſe inſerted in the Bill, to prohibit ſervice in the militia by ſubſtitution, a meaſure unprecedented even in the annals of Bonaparte's tyranny, and another clauſe to prevent militiamen, when embodied, from being employed as ſervants to officers.—Theſe were eſpecially intended to create diſcontent among the Engliſh part of the population, as be-being ſuppoſed to attack their feelings in tender points, conſequently as general diſcontents in the execution of the militia act were expected; it was thought that by adroit management, it would thence be eaſy to aſcribe their origin to the Engliſh.*

The loyalty and zeal, however, of that claſs, defeated the plan; the draft took place, and the Engliſh furniſhed their quota promptly; but contrary to expectation, the complaints were ſo violent among the Canadians about the prohibition of ſubſtitution, that ſome of the authors of that

* By English, I mean those born in Great Britain, or Ireland, or in any other part of the King's dominions, of British or Irish descent.

that moſt tyrannical meaſure, were actually reproached and inſulted for it.—The clauſe about militiamen as ſervants was broken through by ſome of its framers, who had became officers, doubtleſs not intending it to affect themſelves.

What a proud conſideration it is for the Engliſh, who have given an unbought and unremitted ſupport to the Government in whatſoever related to the defence of the country during the war, to reflect, that the moſt pointed neglect and unjuſt inſinuations, have been (and I truſt ever will be) unable to make them ſwerve from their duty to their King and Country.—And it adds to that lofty ſentiment, to be able to ſay with truth, that if the Governor's alledged enemies had been as cool and indifferent at the outſet, about the defence of the Country, as many of his pretended warm friends were, the Province would have been loſt.

VERITAS.

N. B. In my next I ſhall proceed to ſome of the operations in Upper Canada.

[NO. II.]

To the Editor of the Montreal Herald

SIR,

MY first number having had reference to transactions in this Province, let me pass on to Upper Canada.—After the declaration of war by the United States, had obtained belief at Quebec, Sir George Prevost dispatched orders to Captain Roberts, commanding at the Island of St. Joseph, to act upon the defensive.

General Brock was at York, when he received the account of the war, which was conveyed from Queenston in a very short time; and immediately after he sent notice thereof to Lt. Col. St. George, at Amherstburg, and to Capt. Roberts. This express was soon followed by another to St. Joseph, whereby *General Brock* directed Capt Roberts to attack Michilimackinac immediately, if he saw a prospect of success.

That Officer, who had only a handful of invalid Veterans unders his orders, was stimulated to act by the traders there, who saw the importance and necessity of instant decision, in order to circumvent the enemy, and secure the Indians in that quarter, who were then not at war with the United States. Those traders promised their zealous co-operation, which they faithfully performed. Captain Roberts concurring

curring in their opinion, determined (much to his credit) to follow the instructions of General Brock, his immediate Commander, in preference to those of Sir George; and accordingly an expedition was organized, consisting of 30 or 40 Veterans, 200 traders and their engagees, with about 400 Indians, who proceeded to attack the American fort Michilimackinac; which, upon a landing being effected upon that Island, surrendered by capitulation, the 17th of July 1812, (a month after the declaration of war at Washington,) without a drop of blood spilt on either side.

Colonel St. George, at Amherstburg, received from General Brock, information of the war in time to enable him to lay hold of the baggage and medicines of General Hull's army, as the vessel therewith was entering Detroit river, in the hope of our ignorance of the purpose for which that army was approaching by land from the interior. This circumvention of Hull, affected him greatly, and marred his after proceedings. He however crossed over to the British side at Sandwich, on the 12th of July, 1812, with an exterminating proclamation in his hand, (brought from Washington) after a previous cannonade by him of that defenceless village.

Information of this invasion was soon received by General Brock, at Fort George, where he had speedily arrived from York, with an intention

tention of attacking Fort Niagara; but he hesitated about that measure from various considerations, part whereof were his having had no official account of the war, nor any order from Sir George Prevost to guide his proceedings. Indeed it is asserted and believed, that the former did not receive from the latter any written order or instruction for six weeks after the war was declared. So hopeleſs it seems, did Sir George consider the state of Upper Canada, that he avoided meddling therewith, leaving the gallant Brock to his own counsel, and thereby cunningly reserving to himself the power of censure or praise, according to events.

Thus commenced that indecisive conduct, which unhappily Sir George so stedfastly adhered to, during the whole course of the war.

General Brock issued at Fort George an admirable proclamation, in counteraction of Hull's ferocious one, and sent Colonel (now General) Procter, with a ſmall reinforcement (his means allowing of none other) to Amherstburg, where he assumed, the command, whilst the General returned to York, to meet the Legislature of Upper Canada, which, as Preſident of that Province, he had called together, for an extra ſeſſion upon the war being known. This ſeſſion was ſhort, and on the 6th of Auguſt, 1812, he left York with about 100 volunteer Militia, which were increased about Long Point, the whole proceeding by land and water to Amherstburg.

Owing to the great exertion and personal ex-

example of their beloved Commander, they reached that place about the 12th of that month, before which time Hull had re-crossed to Detroit, after committing various excesses, having failed in his attempts to pass the little river Canard, above Amherstburg, and having lost a convoy of provisions, which was captured by a party of the 41st Regt. and Indians, that had been sent into his rear by Colonel Procter, before General Brock arrived, in order to interrupt Hull's communications, and intercept his supplies.

Hull on learning the arrival of Brock, was appalled, as he had previously received information of the capture of Michilimackinac, whereby the northern hive of Indians, as he termed them, was let loose against him.

General Brock lost not a moment, and marching up to Sandwich with what troops and militia he had collected, and a band of Indians under the brave and ever to be lamented celebrated Chief Tecumseth, he cannonaded the enemy in their position at Detroit, and next day passed over with his whole force to the American side some miles below, with a determination to assault that post; but General Hull prevented that necessity, by capitulating, to surrender himself and his army of 2500 men, with 25 pieces of cannon, which took place on the 16th of August, 1812. This most important event was effected without loss, and an invaluable acquisition

tion of muſquetry and cannon thereby obtained, whereof we were greatly in want, eſpecially of the former, for the militia, who now had the honor of equipping themſelves with the ſpoils they ſo meritoriouſly aided in capturing from the enemy. General Brock, alike humane as brave, allowed the American Militia to go home, and after providing for their return in ſafety to Kentucky and Ohio, leaving Colonel Procter in command at Detroit, he flew back as it were to Fort George, which he reached on the 24th of the before mentioned month.

Then or *before*, was communicated to him the information of that *deadly armiſtice*, concluded by Sir George Prevoſt with General Dearborn, which had ſo fatal an effect upon all the future operations, and which tied up the hands of the gallant Brock, from executing his intended plan of ſweeping the American Poſts, to Sackett's Harbour incluſive—an operation that moſt certainly could have been then effected.

This armiſtice propoſed by Sir George Prevoſt merits ſerious conſideration, from its operation being ſo greatly in favor of the enemy at that time, and ſo diſadvantageous to us.—A period moſt precious to us, if we had profited of it with vigour, was thereby loſt in inaction, and the enemy in conſequence, allowed to recover from the panic, into which they were thrown by Hull's capture.

The tranſport of the American Stores, ord-

nance and proviſions, of each of which they were much in want, not being prohibited by that armiſtice, was accordingly protected and faciliated by it on Lake Ontario, and along the Niagara frontier, beyond the enemy's moſt ſanguine hopes, whilſt their then only diſpoſable and invading force, under General Hull, on the Detroit frontier, was left at full liberty, to profit by circumſtances, the armiſtice as to him being at his option.

Moſt fortunately, however, Hull's buſineſs was ſettled by capitulation before the armiſtice was known to General Brock or him; but had it reached him in time, he of courſe would gladly have accepted it, to gain delay for the arrival of reinforcements, and a ſupply of proviſions, from which would have reſulted the ſalvation of his army, the prejudicial conſequences whereof to us are incalculable; for, had a knowledge of it reached the Indian nations at that time, ſuch a diſguſt and diſtruſt would have been thereby excited, as could never have been removed; and the firſt effect of which would have appeared in the immediate diſperſion of the Indians, whoſe powerful and indiſpenſable aid, at that early period of the conteſt, would have been totally loſt to us. To the facts and obſervations above ſtated, I muſt add the extraordinary circumſtance, that a ſtaff Officer was ſent expreſs from Montreal to Upper Canada, to prevent General Brock from proceeding to the weſtern Diſtrict, but which moſt happily was prevented

prevented from taking effect, by the extraordinary rapidity of the movements of that moſt zealous and gallant officer, who had moved thither before the officer ſo ſent could reach him.

Madiſon's rejection of this armiſtice, was followed by that *chilling defensive ſyſtem*, which General Brock was inſtructed by Sir George to follow, and which palsied his operations, until his country had to mourn over his fatal loſs, at the battle of Queenſton, on the 13th of October, 1812.

Such however was the effect of the impulſe he had given, and the valour and zeal wherewith the regular troops, militia, and Indians, had been inſpired, that the valuable effects thereof ſurvived him, and gave a brilliant victory on that day to his ſucceſſor, General Sheaffe, a lover of armiſtices alſo, who in proof thereof, made *one of his own*, which threw away moſt of the advantages of that victory; for he neglected (although ſtrongly urged thereto,) to take Fort Niagara, which could have been done on the afternoon of the day of the Queenſton battle, without loſs, as the enemy had temporarily, entirely, or almoſt entirely, then evacuated it. Had he done this, and at ſame time croſſed over a part of his force to Lewis Town, as he was urged to do, and as Brock would have done, had he ſurvived, the whole Niagara line would have been cleared of the enemy, and all our after diſaſters in that quarter prevented.

It has been urged in favor of Sir George's timid defenſive ſyſtem, that it was proper, in order to avoid irritating the enemy, and thereby uniting them;—as alſo that his force was inadequate to offenſive warfare. Now no poſitions were ever more untenable; for to think of conciliating an enemy, by leaving to him the full benefit of maturing in ſecurity all his means of annoyance againſt you, and at the ſame time muzzling yourſelf, is a moſt extraordinary doctrine. Surely to do ſo, muſt enſure ſucceſs to that enemy, as we know, that ſucceſs will unite diſcordant parties and intereſts; whilſt defeats promote diſunion, and would have ſtrengthened the anti-war party in the States, by furniſhing to them unanſwerable arguments, when depicting the folly and impolicy of the war, which had been ſo wantonly declared by the Madiſonian party.

Were facts in ſupport of this view of the ſubject neceſſary, they would be found, in the effects upon the public mind in that country, produced by the capture of Michilimakinac and Detroit, with Hull's army.

Did theſe events irritate and unite the enemy againſt us? *no*; they increaſed irritation it is true, but againſt their own Government,

In diſcuſſing the merits or demerits of Sir George's *defenſive ſyſtem*, it is proper to define, what I mean by *offenſive* and *defenſive*. Accordingly, I do not mean to contend for ſuch a ſyſtem

ſyſtem of operations, as would have aimed at a military occupancy during the war, of any one Poſt in the States along the Canada frontier, excepting Fort Niagara, and perhaps Oſwego, with ſuch Poſts *within the Indian territory only* as might have been neceſſary for *their* and *our defence*: but I do moſt ſtrongly contend, that a ſyſtem of attack upon the depots of the enemy along our frontiers, whether military or naval, for the purpoſe of deſtroying them before completion, and then retiring into our own territory, would have been the beſt, the cheapeſt, and in all points of view, the moſt effectual defence for theſe provinces, conjointly with a reſpectable naval force upon the Lakes, to cover and give ſecurity and efficiency to ſuch a mode of warfare.

I alſo contend, that this would not have irritated, but diſunited the enemy, becauſe the withdrawal in ſucceſſion of our attacking force, immediately after the attainment of the objects thereof reſpectively, would have proved by facts, not to be miſunderſtood, that our purpoſe was not attack beyond the ſtrict line of what was indiſpenſable to ward off the effects of the preparations making at thoſe depôts, with a view to our ſubjugation.

And as to deficiency of means, or of force, under the orders of Sir George, for executing ſuch a ſyſtem of attack, I deny the fact. Look only at what was done by the active energy of a Brock, with

with a handful of men; alſo what more he would have done had his hands not been tied at a period ſo ill timed; and contraſt theſe with the drowſy inactivity of Sir George Prevoſt, and its fatal conſequences. It is activity and energy of mind which are valuable requiſites in the qualifications of a military commander, and not the locomotive faculty of a Poſt-boy, which can be better executed, in general, by a ſubſtitute than a principal.

Moſt military men will allow, that a long line cannot be effectually defended by a few troops, if the enemy be left wholly at liberty without counteraction, to chooſe his time and place of attack; whereas, if inſtead of attempting to defend the whole line, the leſs important points were abandoned for a time, and the force concentered in one or more important poſitions; and *ſuch force* when ſo concentrated, converted into an active, inſtead of a paſſive *one*, by either attacking the enemy at once, in his chief preparatory depôts; or by threatening ſeveral of them, turn feints into real attacks as opportunities offered; the tables would, by ſuch a ſyſtem, be turned, and the enemy (eſpecially an undiſciplined one) be reduced to the defenſive.

According to the well known principle in mechanics, that velocity is equal to weight, a ſmall force, by well directed activity of operation, may be made to produce a greater effect, than three times

times its numerical ſtrength could, when tied to the diſheartening ſyſtem of mere defence.

Let me pauſe here, and return to Lower-Canada, for the purpoſe of making this remark, which no ſophiſtry can overturn, viz :—that the capture of Michilimakinac, with that of Detroit, and General Hull's army ; and the occular proof thereof afforded to the population of Lower Canada by the march of that General, his officers and regular troops, as priſoners through Montreal ; came ſo opportunely in aid of the La Chine buſineſs, as in conjunction therewith, and the previous activity and zeal diſplayed at Montreal ; *to ſtrike dumb the preachers of prudence*, to fix the wavering, and to confirm the great bulk of the people in loyalty.

Now in the name of truth, what ſhare or merit had Sir George Prevoſt in all this ? *None* ! notwithſtanding all the falſehoods ſo induſtriouſly circulated by the * Editor of the Quebec Gazette,

NOTE * This Gentleman is now calling out for a *truce* or *armiſtice*, which doubtleſs would be very convenient for the purpoſe of his party, in order that the *poiſon* infuſed by his and their *falſe repreſentations*, might take full effect, by with-holding *the antidote of truth* ; but that cannot be, after ſuch continued deceptions, and more eſpecially after the *moſt falſe and impudent two per cent doctrine*, promulgated by that Editor, wherein he makes the approval of Sir George's meaſures, *the criterion of loyalty ;*—conſequently by that rule, thoſe who ſtirred themſelves moſt actively in the ſupport of *the Government*, during the war, and at its commencement marched to ſuppreſs an inſurrection ſtriking at the vitals of our defence, are to be held *as diſloyal* ; and the inſurgents with *their abettors* at that time, *good men and true*—for true it is, that moſt of the *former* are *non-addresssers*, whilſt all of the latter are *addreſſers*.

Gazette, and reprinted at Halifax. He was merely a paſſive inſtrument at that time; neither did *he* give any orders or impulſe, nor did *his now pretended friends* give any example, to produce or contribute to, *ſuch happy events*. In the whole of *these events*, all that *he* had to do, was to reap the fruits of what others had sown; but much of which fruit was allowed to periſh without being uſed; and yet at this day it would be ſuppoſed (if we liſtened only to the addreſſers, and could baniſh the uſe of our memories) that all was owing to Sir George.

It is well known that a perſon by repeatedly mentioning a ſtory, however unfounded, at laſt believes in it, and ſo it may be with many, who aid in the deluſion practiſed and practiſing; but it is in the recollection of many, what ſurpriſe was expreſſed by one of Sir George's suite, upon their arrival at Montreal, the beginning of July, 1812; when he exclaimed—"Why you are quite a different people here, for inſtead of alarm, all ſeem to have laid aſide buſineſs, and to think of nothing but preparation to reſiſt the enemy."

It has been often ſaid, that Sir George has the merit of doing what Sir James Craig would not have attempted, viz: to defend both Provinces; whilſt the other would have thought of nothing but ſecuring Quebec. As to what Sir James would have done, can be only matter of opinion now, as dead men tell no tales; but judging

ing of him by the preparations he made in veſſels upon the Upper Lakes, bequeathed to his ſucceſſor; and by his capacity and energy in other reſpects; I think there can be no preſumption in ſuppoſing, that had he lived, and been placed under the like circumſtances as Sir George was in, when he arrived at Montreal in July, 1812, he would have made a more important uſe of the facts and advantages then developed. Beſides it amounts almoſt to proof, that Sir George had not decided upon a general defence before he came to Montreal, elſe he would have inſtructed General Brock, and given other indications of ſuch a determination, at an earlier period than he did.

Now does it require the *gift of divination* to ſay, what would have been *the conſequence*, if General Brock's conduct, and his inſtructions to Colonel St. George, and afterwards to Colonel Procter, at Amherſtburg, as alſo to Captain Roberts, at St. Joſeph, had been the ſame as General Prevoſt? *No*,—for *it* would aſſuredly have been this: St. Joſeph would have been captured by the American Garriſon of Michilimakinac, inſtead of capturing them. Amherſtburg would have fallen to Hull. The Indians, from neceſſity, muſt either have joined the enemy, or become tame ſpectators of our fate. General Hull and his army would have deſcended like a torrent, increaſing in its courſe by bands of American militia, and of diſaffected Americans in Upper Canada, until they had ſwept the

country, certainly to Montreal; but probably to Quebec; for, as Sir George would have ſhut himſelf ſpeedily up in that fortreſs, it is to be feared, that our militia would have liſtened *to the preachers of prudence, now his idolizers*, and might have prevailed upon them *à reſter tranquilles chez eux.*

I therefore re-aſſert upon ſubſtantial grounds, that not to Sir George, but General Brock, the Indians, the Traders and Engagees, and Upper Canada Militia, in aid of the few regular troops then in that Province; and to the Montreal Militia, in aid of the few regulars, with the measures purſued here before SIR GEORGE'S arrival, at this place, the ſalvation of both Provinces, at the commencement of the war, is, under the favor of divine providence, to be aſcribed. In my next, I ſhall sketch ſome ulterior operations; having already occupied beyond a full proportion of your independent paper,

"*VERITAS.*"

Montreal, 18th April, 1815.

[NO. III.]

To the Editor of the Montreal Herald

SIR,

There is no profeſſion that requires ſuch a variety and ſuperiority of attainments and qualifications as the Military, to become diſtinguiſhed therein. How few obtain the appellation of a great Commander ! but whether Sir George be really entitled thereto, as his admirers would lead us to believe, may be partly judged of by the following, as well as the preceding relations of facts.

Soon after his arrival in Canada, he made a rapid tour through the upper part of this Province; no doubt for the purpose of viewing it with a military eye, and thereby perſonally judging of the beſt poſitions for defence, in caſe of need. This was highly proper, but like many after excurſions, no viſible reſult followed.

The winter of 1811 paſſed on without any preparation contemplative of war, (the before

mentioned militia act excepted) notwithstanding the fulminations in Congress against us during all that winter ; the open avowal of their designs upon Canada, and the actual spreading of the cloth for Peter B. Porter's war feast, as announced in the Committee of Congress, whereof he was the organ.

The two internal keys of this Province, viz : Isle aux Noix and Coteau du Lac, were either despised or overlooked in that tour, notwithstanding the importance decidedly given to the former, especially, by the French Engineers, and by General Haldimand, who was an able judge of positions, and who had expended a large sum of money in fortifying it, in the former American war,

The cause of this neglect I know not with certainty, but the fact is, that Isle aux Noix was not occupied until some time after the war, and might have been seized by the enemy, had he then possessed sufficient military capacity to estimate its value. Coteau du Lac was not occupied until summer 1813.

Not a gun boat or vessel was built on the river Richelieu at, or above St. Johns, or even thought of, until the Almighty threw into the power of the brave 100th regt. and a few artillery in garrison at Isle aux Noix, two of the enemy's armed vessels, which were captured in a most gallant style, by the aid of a gun boat or two, built at Quebec, by order of Sir James Craig,

Craig, which had been conveyed over land to Saint John's; and which captures formed the baſis of a flotilla for lake Champlain, and firſt ſuggeſted the idea of endeavoring to command it.

It has been matter of ſurpriſe to many, why a number of flat boats, capable of carrying heavy guns were never built at La Chine, to be ſtationed below the Caſcades, at Iſle Perrault, or wheresoever elſe in lake St. Louis, might have been conſidered moſt adviſable and convenient, for a rapid movement to attack the enemy, if they deſcended the St. Lawrence, immediately after paſſing the rapids of the Cedars, before they could collect together, and form; it being certain, that their boats muſt neceſſarily ſault or paſs the rapids unconnected, and by compariſon, as it were, in Indian file, or in ſections of a very ſmall front; conſequently their diſcomfiture would have been eaſy, had they been met immediately after, by a reſpectable number of armed boats of ours, ready and freſh for the attack.

In ſhort, military foreſight, anticipation, or counteraction of the possible or probable movements or deſigns of the enemy, formed no part of Sir George's ſyſtem of operations; if any ſyſtem or plan there ever was, which may be doubted, ſeeing the *vacillating meaſures* purſued upon all occaſions; as hardly a regiment could be moved from one place to another, without

without half a dozen counter orders; and consequently to repair a disaster, always cost us double or quadruple the expence, and number of men, that would have been necessary by timeous precaution to prevent it; besides thereby always receiving, instead of giving the law to the enemy.

The most palpable and fatal error however of all, is yet to be told, viz: that of not *preserving the command of the Upper Lakes.* I use the word *preserving* instead of *acquiring*, on this occasion, because Sir James Craig left Sir George Prevost a most decided superiority upon those Lakes; for on each, we had several vessels of force, and the enemy had only the Oneida brig of 16 guns, upon Ontario, and the Adams of about the same size, but half armed and manned, upon Erie.

The latter vessel was just rebuilt at Detroit, when captured by General Brock, and became a prize to us, until thrown away by some strange misconduct, along with the Caledonia, belonging to the North West Company, which vessels came down with American prisoners, and part of the guns taken at Detroit; when on arriving at Fort Erie, to accommodate the landing of those prisoners upon the American side, they incautiously were anchored so far over towards that shore, as to be boarded in the night, taken and carried away. The Adams got aground afterwards, and was destroyed: but the Caledonia,

donia, although injured, was preſerved by the enemy, and became an inſtrument in the diſaſtrous capture of our fleet upon Lake Erie the next year.

The *command of the Lakes*, and eſpecially thoſe bordering upon Upper Canada, is ſo evidently an object of primary conſideration in the defence of the Canadas, and the upper province in particular, that it furniſhes matter of aſtoniſhment, how a military man could be ſo ignorant of, or blind to, *its importance*, as to *allow it* to be wreſted from him, when the means of *the preservation of that command* were ſo completely in his power.

In conjunction with the naval command of thoſe internal waters, the friendſhip of the Indians was a point of equal importance, at the commencement of the war. The foreſight and energy of a *Brock preserved the latter*.—The cold indifference of a *Prevoſt loſt the former*; and yet the Addreſſers * have the ſhameleſs effrontery to ſay, "the ſmallneſs of the regular "army with which your Excellency was left to "withſtand the whole efforts of the United States,

NOTE * The arts used to obtain signatures to the Addresses, are in many instances most shameful. Officers of militia have called their men together, and made them sign, or rather make their marks by roll call. In other cases, the people have been impounded in the Church after Mass, (but my information leads me to believe that the Clergy had no agency in this,) and there are instances where youths, who could write, have been made to sign, to encrease the actual number of signatures.

" States, for two years, *and the insufficiency of* " *the Naval force on the Lakes, have exposed his* " *Majesty's arms to some reverses*," whilst it is notorious from the facts above stated, that *this insufficiency on the Lakes*, proceeded entirely from neglect of the idol thus addressed.

How came they to dare to venture upon *such an imposture?* Is it because they reckon upon the like banishment of the use of memory in the reading of those Addresses in Canada, as is necessary in all the operations of the junto; or if not so, is it the idea that no person here, durst attempt to expose *it;* or finally is it, that at a distance (as the Addresses are manufactured for exportation) they counted upon no one finding *it* out, as they meant to keep their own counsel.

However, I do entertain some hope, that they have reckoned without their host; and that *Le Bon Vieux Temps* and myself, who are fellow labourers in the same vineyard, for the correction of falsehood, and support of truth, without having any knowledge of, or communication with each other, will open the eyes of many, if we cannot of all the blind; for of the cure of the honest really blind patriots, I cannot doubt, but of the wilfully blind, they must be left to be cured by their own folly, and the contempt of all independent minds.

Upon the subject of the upper Lakes, their neglect in 1812, cannot be excused, even upon the

the principle of ignorance or inadvertancy; for the common table talk that ſummer at Montreal was the incompetency of the Officers and men on board the King's ſhips on Lake Ontario (and that talk is ſuppoſed to have been always better known at Head Quarters, than the deſigns of the enemy,) and that a ſtrong remedy was nec ſſary, or th command thereof would be loſt. Of that incompetency there was furniſhed the moſt ſtriking proof by Commodore Earle, when he went over in the Royal George with others to Sacket's Harbour, in ſummer 1812, to deſtroy the Oneida Brig; and on arriving there, finding her hauled into the inner harbour, and one or two of her guns landed and planted on the bluff point, (for then there was no garriſon) without cover, which fired at him; the gallant Commodore immediately turned his tail or ſtern to the enemy, and returned to Kingſton *re infecta*, but with whole bones. Yet no notice was taken of this at Head Quarters, nor any remedy attempted, and he remained in command of the Ontario Squadron, until the arrival of Sir James Yeo, and then forſooth was offended at being ſuperseded.

Sir George in not noticing this conduct of Earle, might poſſibly have had an anticipatory feeling of what might happen to himſelf at that place, at a future day. It is proper to remark, that Commodore Earle does not belong to the Royal Navy.

Every one wondered why Sir George did not make an energetic application to Capt. Paſcoe, of the Tartarus ſloop of war, (who arrived at Quebec from Halifax after the war was known there) to lay up his ſhip, and march with his officers and crew to Lake Ontario, for the purpoſe of deſtroying the Oneida Brig, and every craft on that Lake, belonging to the enemy; which aſſuredly in ſuch caſe, could have been completely accompliſhed, and the ſaid officers and crew brought back to Quebec, in leſs than eight weeks after their departure, if their return to that place ſhould have been inſiſted upon.

We all know, that Sir George could not have commanded Capt. Paſcoe to do ſo, but we alſo know the anxiety of a Britiſh officer, in either ſervice, for active employment; and that if a ſtrong caſe had been made out, which ſurely at at that time required no ingenuity, as a plain ſtatement of the truth, would have been ſufficient to convince Capt. Paſcoe that the ſalvation or loſs of the Canadas, *might depend* upon his acquieſcence or refuſal. In ſuch caſe, who can doubt, that he would have conſented; and further, that he would have been applauded and promoted for ſo doing, whilſt thouſands of lives and millions of money, would have been ſaved by the meaſure, if due vigilance had been continued afterwards, to prevent the neſt from being formed at Sacket's Harbour.

Inſtead of this, ſo little feeling had Sir George upon this grand arm of defence, that a lifeleſs common

common place attempt was made, to get ſeamen at Quebec, as if in time of peace, for 8 or 10 dollars a month, when merchants were giving more than twice as much; but what would ſeamen have availed under ſuch Officers as Earle?

I will further aſk the Quebec Addreſſers, who are alſo alive *to the inſufficiency of the Naval force on the Lakes*, why all the ſhip carpenters of Quebec and Montreal, and all the batteau carpenters of the Province, were not engaged to keep up the ſuperiority we had in armed veſſels on the Upper Lakes, at the commencement of the war, and to build batteaux, the neglect of which latter, alſo occaſioned infinite detriment to the military ſervice?

I will alſo aſk them, whether they ever heard, that a Quebec Ship Builder, who would have contracted for a 36 gun Frigate on Lake Ontario, to be ſpeedily built, was not laid aſide, for the ſake of a thouſand pounds in his demand beyond what Sir George would agree to give?

After all this, it is the acmé of aſſurance to inſinuate, that *Miniſters* were to blame for ſuch inſufficiency, eſpecially as *they* could only have a knowledge of our wants here through *Sir George's information*; and if *he* was ſilent or defective in explanation of his wants, *he*, not *Miniſters*, ought juſtly to be blamed. But it is known, and has been declared in Parliament by Miniſters, that they never furniſhed leſs, and

frequently much more, than the requisition from hence.

When a defective military force is mentioned, let it be recollected, that Sir George had the benefit of two strong additional regiments, which arrived early in summer 1812 to replace two weak ones, and he very properly kept the whole.

Appearances warrant the belief, that Sir George was first roused from his torpor about the Lakes and Indians, by the memorial of the Committees of trade, presented in October 1812, (since republished in the Quebec Gazette, from a Halifax paper) wherein, the importance of those objects was forcibly dwelt upon, and the necessity of having Officers and seamen from the Royal Navy, strongly pointed out. Accordingly, an exertion in shipbuilding on the lakes was made in winter 1812, and officers and seamen from the Royal Navy arrived early in May 1813.

The exertions of the enemy at Sackett's Harbour, then an open unfortified place, was such before the end of summer 1812, as to produce, in October of that year, four armed schooners in addition to the Oneida brig, with which Commodore Chauncey chased Commodore Earle in the Royal George, into Kingston Harbour; where we were cannonaded by the enemy, whose Commodore and squadron went off with flying colours in triumph, and returned to Sackett's Harbour, where they, that autumn, launched their

their new frigate the Madison.

They also made exertions on Lake Erie, where they equipped some small armed vessels: but by navigating on those lakes very late in 1812, they narrowly escaped that destruction of their armed force from the elements, which our means ought to have inflicted, at an earlier period of the season.

The exertions in building on Lake Ontario, made by Sir George in winter 1812, were certainly great; but by a strange fatality, the largest of the two frigates laid down, was at York, and the other at Kingston, thus throwing away above half of the effect—for by thus dividing our force, it was in the power of the enemy to prevent the conveyance of guns and stores for the ship at York;—or even if those could have been conveyed at an immense expense by land in winter, the junction afterwards would have been impracticable, from the facility of interposing a superior force in the lake between those places.

There was another striking impropriety in building at York, without providing the means of security there, as the works of defence, projected by General Brock (when he contemplated, before the war, the removal of the naval depot from Kingston to York, by reason of the proximity of the former to the States in winter by the ice) were dicontinued by orders from below, and never resumed. The position intended

ded to have been fortified by General Brock, near York, was capable of being made very strong, had his plan been executed ; but as it was not, nor any other plan of defence adopted, a ship yard without protection, became an allurement to the enemy, as was felt to the cost of the Inhabitants of York.

I shall defer to a future number, the consideration of the enemy's naval preparations upon Lake Erie, and our supineſs there in summer 1813.

The storm that had been long threatening the Lower Province from Plattsburg, at length seemed ready to burst upon it, as notice was given at Montreal on the evening of 17th of November 1812, that the enemy were advancing, and that upon a certain signal of alarm being fired from the citadel, the troops and embodied militia were to prepare to croſs over to Longueil. Next afternoon the alarm guns were fired, and the troops and Battalion of Engliſh embodied Volunteers, were in consequence put in motion. The latter, although they had to collect over the town and different suburbs, were upon the beach equipped for ſervice nearly as ſoon as the regulars, where they had to wait two hours for boats, which being at length procured, they croſſed the river in the dark, and marched to Laprairie, where they arrived at midnight, and were then diſtributed in quarters. The Canadian flank companies of the town, went over the day following or afterwards, and

the

the whole country militia in the adjoining counties, were in movement, with an alacrity that will for ever do them honor.

The weather became very severe, and the enemy retired after encountering a picket of indians near River La Cole, who were so well managed as to occasion the enemy to fire upon each other in the night, whilst the picket fell back and escaped without loſs. Upon its being known that the enemy had retired, the troops and militia returned to their quarters and homes, which closed the operations of 1812, in Lower Canada.

Almost every body was sensible what might have been done by us on Lake Ontario in 1812, and a sad mortification at the want of exertion there ensued. All, however, looked forward with hope to the winter, when a confident expectation was entertained, that past neglects would be then compensated for, by a coup de main of the troops acroſs the ice, to deſtroy the nest of Hornets collected at Sackett's Harbour, whilst in their torpid state.

The winter came, and seemed to have been made by the Almighty to favor the enterprize, for the ice was never known so good. All were on the tiptoe of expectation, when Sir George came up in February, and proceeded on to Kingston. A movement of troops was looked for, but alas none was made, and all evaporated *in fumo ;* but a desultory attack upon Ogdensburg,

densburg, in consequence of a kind of negative permission given by His Excellency on passing the post at Prescott, the success of which attack proved that the enemy were then wholly unprepared *at Sackett's*, as their Commander was actually at Albany, and no preparation for resistance *there* thought of, as no attack was expected, until awaked by the fate of Ogdensburg, when all was hurry and bustle, in every quarter. They then began to collect a force to prevent, what ought by that time to have been by us effected; and there can be no doubt about our success, had we made the attempt without creating previous alarm.

The public being thus again disappointed in their favourite *delenda est Carthago (Sackett's Harbour)*, relapsed into a gloom, which continued until dissipated by the electrifying news of the arrival of Sir James Yeo, at Quebec, on 5th May 1813, in the Woolwich, with officers and seamen of the Royal Navy, for the ships built and building at Kingston, the frigate at York having been, as was to be expected, previously burnt. Sir James and his people reached Kingstone in less than two months from Portsmouth.

The Almighty appeared again to favor us, and the exertions made at Kingston after the arrival there of those officers and seamen, to equip the fleet, was so great, that an attempt was determined to be made upon Sackett's Harbour, whilst Commodore Chauncey and his fleet were up the lake. Sir George had accompanied Sir

James

James to Kingston. Troops accordingly were embarked, and Sir George himself was most unfortunately along with them.

The fleet ſailed—the wind blew propitiously, and they were soon off the wiſhed for Harbour of Sacketts, but no attack was made that day. Here again ſtepped in that accurſed indecision which is so ruinous in military operations, and it is generally ſupposed, the troops would have returned without making any attempts to land, had not ſome American troops, next day (which coming from Oswego in boats, had been chaſed from an Island by our Indians) come and ſurrended themselves to our fleet.

This encouraged a landing to be made, although the wind having become contrary, it thwarted a naval co-operation, but it was not neceſſary to the ſucceſs of the enterprise.

The troops were disembarked, but without artillery, and advanced with their usual spirit, when the enemy in dismay fled, whilst our men coming to a block house, which made reſiſtance, were checked. During this advance so hopeleſs did the enemy consider their ſituation, that they burnt a barrack or store, ſpiked the guns of a battery, and began their retreat through the village, ſetting fire to their new frigate the Pike, then on the stocks; and General Brown who commanded, had actually written a proposal of capitulation, which he had appointed a flag of truce to carry to our

Commander, whilst a few men were kept in the block house to give an appearance of resistance, in order to obtain better terms. At this period, in an evil hour, Sir George Prevost, miſtaking the enemy in running away, with the dust thereby thrown up, for a column of reinforcements arriving; immediately gave orders for a precipitate reimbarkation, and then was exhibited, the extraordinary military spectacle of a retreat, I will not say a flight, back to back!

The enemy upon obſerving this, could hardly believe their ſenſes, but after a little reflection, went to extinguiſh the fire in the frigate, which they effected (being built of green wood) before ſhe ſuſtained any material injury.

Here ended the ſecond expedition to Sacketts Harbour. Now I would aſk in reſpect to it, whether the burning of a ſtore by the enemy himſelf, was not an unequivocal proof of an intention to ſurrender? and further, that if the ſaving of lives was the only motive for retreat, why the attack was not made the evening before, when the enemy was leſs prepared to reſiſt? or why was it made without artillery? or finally, why was not the block-houſe merely maſked, or watched by a part of our force, and the reſt carried round to burn the ſhip, and dock yard, &c. all which was practicable almoſt without the loſs of a man, or the poſſibility of being prevented by the enemy in the block houſe.

The

The above facts about Sacketts harbour were long ago known, and have furnished matter of endless conversation, regret, and mortification. They have been confirmed by military visitors and others, to and from that place since the peace ; and it is now further known, what was previously suspected, that so far from Sacketts being now a second Gibraltar, as was the idea at head quarters, there has been no period when it would not have fallen before 3000 British troops, well commanded and appointed.

It is high time to close this number, and to crave your indulgence until next week, for a continuation. *VERITAS.*

Montreal, 26th April, 1815.

[NO. IV.]

To the Editor of the Montreal Herald

SIR,

In a former number, I mentioned the armistice concluded after the battle of Queenston, by General Sheaffe, upon a proposal from the enemy. It continued as long as it suited their purpose, and when their preparations in boats, &c. were complete, General Smythe, who had succeeded Van Rensselaer in the command of the American Army, and who even amidst the habitual boasting of officers in their service, was considered so pre-eminent in that faculty, as to acquire the furname of Van Bladder—sent notice to General Sheaffe, that the armistice would cease on the 20th of November 1812. On the 28th of that month, he made an attempt to cross over a large force, and land below Fort Erie, having before landed a party which burnt some houses and barns near that Fort, before they were attacked and repulsed.— General Winder commanded this corps, and was repulsed by Lieut. Colonel Bishopp, Inspecting Field Officer, whose force consisted chiefly of militia. —Smythe, after various demonstrations for renewing the attempt, put his men into winter quarters,

quarters, where they became very sickly, and he was obliged to decamp, to avoid the rage of his own troops and militia.

General Sheaffe entertained an idea of evacuating Fort Erie, which at that time, would have had the most pernicious effect, but it was dropt upon being remonstrated against.

The Upper Canada Militia upon the Niagara line, underwent in the autumn of 1812, fatigues and privations, which did them great honor in supporting, and are scarcely credible.—They were harrassed with duty, from unavoidable neceſſity, and without neceſſaries, allowances, or any thing to support them, but the cause in which they were embarked, and the zeal infused into them by their beloved Brock, unhappily then no more.

It has been a common remark, that any notice taken of the Militia of the Upper Province by Sir George, was in a cold forbidding manner, as if extorted by neceſſity rather than proceeding from choice; and the sentiment is general in that Province, that he seldom gave them the aid in troops for their defence, that his means were equal to; and generally when given, was too late. being only put in motion at a great diſtance, after a diſaſter was known, and then, as if fearful of sending too many.

His duty, however, extended alike to the protection of both provinces, but we hear of no

addresses

addresses to him from Upper Canada, upon his departure, being either presented, or intended. Yet these who saw and felt the real tug and burthen of the war, are assuredly better judges of his military merits, than the addressers of the Lower Province, who, with very few exceptions, were not in a situation to see or hear a shot fired.

Reverting to naval operations, it is to be observed, that the exertions made by the enemy at Sacketts Harbour, in winter 1812, were such as to enable Commodore Chauncey, after embarking General Dearbon with 2500 troops, exclusive of his crews, to sail in April 1813, with ten armed vessels, which proceeded off York, and on the 27th of April, having landed General Pike with those troops, they defeated General Sheaffe with a very considerable loss, who had with him only about 600 men, half whereof were militia and Indians. The enemy sustained a heavy loss, by the explosion of our powder magazine, in which a slow match was left, when our troops retreated. Had it exploded a few minutes later, the whole of the enemy's troops would have been destroyed. General Pike lost his life by it, and a great many officers and men.

Before our troops retired, they burnt our frigate on the stocks, and naval stores. The *enemy* burnt part of the military buildings, which they completed on their second visit to York in July —and notwithstanding a capitulation granted to

the

the inhabitants *in April*, after General Sheaffe's retreat, *they* then burnt the civil public buildings, although General Dearborn has had the unblushing effrontery since, deliberately to deny his having done so. The enemy remained until the 2d of May, carrying off the stores and provisions found at York when they re-embarked, and stood over to Niagara, where they landed the troops, and returned to Sacketts Harbour. At this period, they also burnt a Tavern, some distance above York, which had belonged to government, and intended destroying Hatt's Mills, but were prevented by the fear of Indians being in that neighbourhood. Thus, and before at Fort Erie, the enemy, without provocation, commenced that system of burning and destroying public and private buildings, which they prosecuted afterwards upon so many occasions, without compunction or feeling, although they affected to consider the retaliation executed at Washington upon *Public Buildings* only, as an unprecedented barbarity; and in this they were seconded by an unprincipled party in the British Parliament, who seem always alive to the distresses of *an enemy*, but deaf to those of *our own subjects;* as if *they* were unworthy of protection from the ravages of *that enemy, however atrocious.* Nay, it would actually appear, from the speeches in Parliament, that those factious declaimers were afraid that too hard conditions would be imposed at Ghent, upon America, notwithstanding her base declaration of war against us, whilst fighting for the independence of nations.

General

General Sheaffe has been blamed for the unjudicious diſtribution and management of the troops he had, but it muſt be evident, that he had not the means of making an effectual reſiſtance, againſt ſuch a ſuperiority, covered by a fleet; although it is thought that, had he returned, and attacked the enemy immediately after the exploſion, their defeat would have been certain. It muſt excite aſtoniſhment, how a frigate and a quantity of ſtores and proviſions could have been placed in a ſituation ſo totally unprovided with the means of defence: for of the few regulars that General Sheaffe had, 100 of the 8th Regiment were there by accident, having, at that time halted on their march from Kingſton to Burlington and Fort George.

The American fleet returned *from Niagara* to Sacketts, for a freſh cargo of troops, with which they again ſailed, and proceeded to the *former place*, where they were landed, and preparations made for croſſing over, to attack Fort George.

On the 27th of May, 1813, (after having on the 24th and 25th cannonaded Fort George from the American Fort, batteries and ſhips,) the enemy landed a large force at day break, on the Britiſh ſide, under cover of a heavy and deſtructive fire from their fleet, when having advanced, they were gallantly, but ineffectually met and oppoſed by ſome of our troops and militia, who were obliged to give way, and with thoſe left in Fort George, to fall back to Queenston

ton, after dismantling the Fort, and destroying the stores.

Our loss was considerable, and General Vincent, who commanded our troops, found it necessary to continue his retreat to the head of the Lake, after withdrawing what force we had along the Niagara line, up to Fort Erie inclusive, and concentrating the whole near Burlington heights.

The intermediate country being now at the mercy of the enemy, they pushed forward a large force, under Generals Winder and Chandler, as far as Stoney Creek. Their intention was to attack our united force, wherein they were circumvented, by the gallant and daring manœuvre proposed to General Vincent, which was embraced, of attempting to carry their camp by surprize. This was executed before day break, on the 6th of June, by about 500 of the 8th and 49th Regiments, who attacked about 3500 of the enemy, advantageously posted, who were defeated with the loss of a number of killed, and the two Generals abovementioned with 5 other officers, and about 100 men made prisoners, and four pieces of cannon, with their horses and tumbrils captured. Our troops soon after retired, when the enemy became so panic struck, as to destroy a quantity of provisions and baggage, and retreat precipitately 16 miles to the forty mile creek, where they were joined by General Lewis, with a reinforcement. From that place they also fled, (upon the appearance

of Sir James Yeo, and our fleet, with ſome troops on board, who cannonaded and ſummoned them) leaving their tents ſtanding, and hardly halted until they reached Fort George.

Sir James took and deſtroyed many of their boats with proviſions, but unfortunately our numbers were too ſmall to take advantage of this panic, elſe the enemy might have been expelled to their own ſide.

Commodore Chauncey hearing of the attack upon Sacket's Harbour, had returned there with his fleet, where he remained until the end of July, when the Pike was ready. In the intermediate time, Sir Jas. Yeo was active in scouring the ſhore of the lake, having taken ſeveral ſmall veſſels of the enemy with provisions and ſtores, beſides doing them other injury: and keeping open the communication with our troops at the head of Lake Ontario.

Our troops as they got reinforced, advanced towards the enemy, and on the 24th of June, the American Colonel Boerſteler, with about 500 men and 2 field pieces, who had marched into the country, were attacked by a body of Indians, and ſo hard preſſed by them, as to be compelled to ſurrender, upon the appearance of Lieut. Fitzgibbon, and a few men of the 49th Regt.

Our troops, in the ſummer of 1813, took up a position from St David to the four mile creek, and were commanded by General DE ROTTENBURG,

BURG, who joined them from Lower Canada, and relieved General Sheaffe, as President of the Upper Province, and Senior officer upon the Staff there.

On the 4th of July, 1813, Lt. Col. Clark of the militia, went over with a ſmall force to Fort Schloſſer, deſtroyed that post, and brought off some provisions and arms. On the 11th of same month, Lt. Colonels Biſhopp and Clark croſſed to Black Rock, with 240 men, defeated the guard there, and brought off several boats with stores and provisions, and 3 field pieces, and deſtroyed the store houses and barracks, with ſome cannon and a veſſel. Unfortunately however, they remained too long, and were attacked on coming away, by a freſh party of the enemy, and a body of Indians in their interest, whereby we suffered some loſs, which was greatly aggravated by the gallant Colonel Biſhopp, receiving three wounds, which occasioned his death, and deprived the service of a promiſſing young officer, of most amiable private character. He was a great favourite with the Militia, and greatly lamented by them.

Excepting these excursions, nothing of moment happened in the centre division, until joined by Sir George for a few days, when a grand demonſtration against Fort George was displayed, by marching the army up the hill, and down again, which resulted in satisfying him, that nothing could be done to dislodge the enemy.

In

In the month of July 1813, the Growler and Eagle, which had been so gallantly captured on the 3d of June, near Isle aux Noix, were manned by seamen from a sloop of war at Quebec, commanded by Capt. Everard, who came up himself with his officers and men, when being distributed in those vessels, he took the command of one, and Capt. Pring, of the Royal Navy, who had come with Captain Barclay, and other officers, in April from Halifax, took the command of the other. These vessels and some gun boats accompanied Col. J. Murray, Inspecting field Officer, with a small military force in batteaux, which proceeding to Plattsburgh, burnt the stores and barracks at Champlain, at Saranack, *(since rendered so famous,)* and at Swanton, after which they returned. Our armed vessels looked into Burlington, where the enemy had moored theirs so close under a battery, as not to be got at.

This service was performed without loss, and furnished a proof of what zeal, intelligence, and activity, when well directed, are capable of; besides giving a pledge of what might be expected at a future day, from the services of that valuable officer, should an opportunity be placed in his power. This pledge he afterwards well redeemed at Niagara.

On the 31st of July, Com: Chauncey (the Pike being now equipped) with 12 sail, appeared off York, and landed a second time, when he burnt the remaining barracks, stores, and wood-

Yard.

Yard. On re-embarking, he proceeded to the head of Lake Ontario and landed near Burlington heights, with a view of carrying that poſt, but Major Maule with his small force presented so bold a counten nce, and Lt. Col. Battersby with part of the Glengary Regt. being on the march to support him, the enemy gave up the attempt, and stood over to Niagara.

Sir James Yeo having equipped another brig, ſailed from Kingſton on the 31ſt of July with ſix ſail, and meeting the enemy with 11 ſail, off the 12 mile Creek above Niagara, on the 10th of Auguſt 1813, a partial action enſued, which ended in our capturing the Julia and Growler of two guns and 40 men each, whereupon Chauncey having the wind in his favor, took shelter under the guns of Fort Niagara. The enemy had lost the night before, the Scourge of 10 and Hamilton of 9 guns, which overſet in a squall, and the whole of their crews, with the exception of a few, periſhed.

Both fleets soon after came down the Lake, and that of the enemy on ſeeing ours, went into Sackett's Harbour on the 18th of Aug. but ſailed again the ſame day or the following. Ours entered Kingſton Harbour, and after embarking ſome heavy artillery for our army on the Niagara line, again proceeded up the Lake on the 20th of Auguſt.

Nothing of moment happened between the fleets until 20th Sept. when the American, which had

had left Niagara the day before, discovered ours off York, and an action began, which partially continued two hours, wherein our ships had suffered so much in their masts, as to induce Sir James Yeo to push for Burlington heights, off which he anchored, it blowing strong. The Wolfe, Sir James' ship, loſt her main and mizen topmasts in the action, besides receiving other damage, and was preserved by a maſterly and gallant manœuvre of Captain Mulcaſter in the Royal George, who laid his ship between her and the Pike in such a position as to rake the latter, disable her, and cover the retreat, of our squadron. The Pike loſt many killed and wounded, especially by the burſting of ſome of her own guns. Had Chauncey attacked us at our anchorage with determined reſolution, our ſituation would have been very perilous, and might have had a fatal termination.

On the 1ſt of Oct. the enemy's fleet returned to their anchorage off Niagara, but ſailed down the Lake on the 2d or the 5th, the Pike and Sylph being a head, fell in with 5 of our ſmall Schooners and a sloop, employed for the conveyance of proviſions and stores, which had imprudently left York to return to Kingſton, when by injudiciouſly keeping together and ſtanding out into the lake, inſtead of each making the beſt of his way along ſhore, the schooners were captured and carried into Sackett's Harbour, with above 300 men in all on board, including the crews and flank companies of De Watteville's

Watteville's Regt. The sloop ran ashore and was destroyed, one schooner carried 2 guns, and the others one each.

It is time for the prefent to quit Ontario, and fee what was passing on Lake Erie and its neighbourhood.

Colonel Proctor commanding the Right Divifion of the army at Detriot, having received information, that an American corps of upwards of 1000 men, under General Winchester, had reached French Town, River Raisin, 26 miles from Detroit; and alfo learning, that General Harrison with another corps, was on the march to join, did not hesitate to adopt the bold resolution(although acting under orders of Sir George's ufual defensive description) of anticipating the enemy, by attacking Winchester's force before the other could form a junction. Accordingly Colonel Proctor marched to execute this determination with fome regulars, militia, part of the Marine Department, and a body of Indians under the Chief Roundhead, and on the 22d of January 1813, at day break, made so bold an attack upon Winchester's division, as completely to defeat it, taking the General, a Colonel, and many other officers, with about 500 prisoners including wounded, and killed in the action and pursuit, above 400—about 100 escaped. Colonel Proctor and our troops displayed equal humanity as bravery in their exertions to save the vanquished enemy from the retaliation of the Indians, whofe tribes had

had on former occasions suffered so severely from American cruelty. Our loss was about 180 killed and wounded, exclusive of Indians.

The Americans having afterwards established themselves at the rapids of the Miamis of the Lake, Colonel, now General Proctor, again went to attempt to dislodge them from their fort, when (in the 5th May 1813 (whilst carrying on the siege) a body of about 1500 of the enemy under a General Clay, having descended the River in 30 large boats, with a view to form a junction with their comrades in the fort, who co-operating with them, they attacked our positions on both sides of that river, and succeeded in carrying our batteries on the West side, the flankers of the 41st regiment having only time to spike the guns. About 150 of the 41st with a fresh band of Indians sent to recover the guns and battery, turned the fate of the day by a gallant effort, in which the Indians were highly conspicuous. The guns were retaken and about 550 of the enemy's descending force made prisoners. The remainder gained the fort.

The loss in killed and wounded was severe on both sides. Some of the 41st had been taken when the battery was carried by the enemy, but were exchanged after the action was over. General Proctor however was finally obliged to raise the siege and return to Detroit, as the Indians, according to their custom after success, retire

entire to enjoy the plunder they had obtained from the captured boats of the enemy.

Towards the end of July 1813, General Proctor made an attempt with about 400 troops, and a body of Indians upon Fort Meigs, at Sandusky, defended by a Major Croghan; which being cannonaded without effect for some days, was on the 2d of August attempted to be carried by assault, by a party of the 41st, who behaved gallantly, but were repulsed with the loss of Lt Col. Short and a Lt. killed, and about 90 killed and wounded.

It has been said that there was a want of concert among, and co-operation by the Indians on this occasion, but the fact is, that the attack of fortified posts, is neither adapted to their arms, nor to their mode of warfare.

As a general principle, we have erred greatly in expecting from Indians, the aid that regular discipline can alone supply. It has been too common for officers of the line to undervalue them on this account; but it is just as absurd to expect them to change their habits, and act the part of disciplined troops, as it would be to expect, that our best battalions, would go into the woods without baggage, artillery and provisions, and trust to their fusees alone for subsistence and for the attack of the enemy. Each are excellent when in their proper element, but Indian warriors in a settled country are like fish out of the water. We restrain them from their

own mode of warfare, without being able to get them to adopt ours; so that in such situations they are (as in the case of the Indians who retreated to Ancaster and Burlington) a burden instead of a benefit; but whilst we held Detroit and the command of Lake Erie, their services were most valuable, as may be seen from the repeated efforts and heavy losses which it cost the enemy to dislodge us, and which they never could have effected, if we had retained the naval superiority of that Lake.

Whilst upon the subject of the Indians, I cannot but notice the concluding paragraph of a "circular to all officers in command of posts," dated at Montreal 7th Dec. 1812, signed by the Adjutant General, and published in the Quebec Gazette of 8th April 1813, in what is called a "*note dedicated to His Excellency James Madison, Esquire.*" This is a long labored demi-official production, intended to refute the accusations made by him and other Americans, about pretended cruelties committed by the Indians, and our alledged participation therein.

Now as Madison and others well knew that they were asserting what was false, and did so for political purposes, there was just about as much wisdom, in the reasoning in this famous note, as in the attempt once made to wash a blackamoor white. What a useless waste of time it is to argue with an intentional Liar, because you can never make a convert of him. The folly

folly however of this note, I ſhould have paſſed over, but for its miſchievous tendency at t e time in regard to the Indians, as the concluding paragraph runs thus ; " His Excellency diſapproves of any co-operation with the Indians not connected with the ſyſtem of defence of the Province," doubtleſs the wiſe defenſive ſyſtem laid down by his Excellency for the guidance of thoſe officers ; and in the extract of a letter to General Sheaffe contained in the ſame note, will be found theſe words," Sir George Prevoſt is much averſe to allowing the regular troops to be engaged with the Indians in offenſive operations," he might have ſaid with or without them.

Now what can this mean. In plain Engliſh ſimply this.—Get all the aid you can from the Indians for our purpoſes, but take eſpecial care, and I ſtrictly enjoin one and all of you, that if they ſhall be retaliated upon by the enemy for affording us this aid, and in conſequence get their villages and fields of corn deſtroyed, (as actually happened) and their wives and children thereby threatened with ſtarvation, as alſo themſelves with extermination, you are upon no accounts to ſend a man to aſſiſt in their defence, becauſe it would offend His Excellency James Madiſon Eſq. and be liable to miſinterpretation.

The impropriety of iſſuing ſuch an order is manifeſt, but the indiſcretion of publiſhing it in the Quebec Gazette, whereby it might have got to the ears of the Indians was extreme ; for

it

it risked the cutting up of Indian attachment to us by the root, and effectually palsying their efforts for our defence, if not to occasion the turning of their arms against us. Who could expect Indian aid upon such terms ?

This however, is not the only order given, that if it had been literally executed, might have lost the country, as will be seen by and bye ; and we are certainly under the strongest obligations to those officers, who under a strong sense of duty and zeal, studying only the good of the service whereon they were employed, ventured upon the heavy responsibility of evading orders, that t' eir conviction led them to feel, would be productive of ruinous consequences I have already observed that the only armed vessel the enemy had on lake Erie* was captured by General Brock at Detroit in August 1812, and yet in 1813 they h d built and equipped such a force as to capture the whole of our fleet there, although most gallantly defended.

It was my intention to have comprised in this number, the gross neglects respecting Lake Erie and the naval catastrophe thereon ; but as I find that cannot be done without extending this to an inconvenient length for your paper, I must defer it to my next. *VERITAS.*

* In the conclusion of the Editorial paragraph of Quebec Gazette 2d September 1813, will be seen this circumstance forcibly noticed, as also that at the declaration of war, the enemy had only the Oneida upon Lake Ontario; now how he could forget this on manufacturing *The Quebec Address to Sir George*, is rather strange ; unless he counted upon the bad memories of his readers.

If instead of acting the part of the Waggoner and Hercules, he (Sir George) had put his own shoulder immediately to the wheel of Lake defence, instead of calling out at the eleventh hour for aid from Great Britain, at 3000 miles distance, we should have got out of the slough of Lake inferiority, or rather we should never have got into it.

[NO. V.]

To the Editor of the Montreal Herald

SIR,

MY laſt number having cloſed without entering into the neglects reſpecting Lake Erie, I proceed to remark, that ignorance of the *efforts* made by the enemy on that lake whilſt in *their progreſs*, cannot be pretended; for independent of the repeated repreſentations made by General Proctor and Captain Barclay, and the information that was, or might have been had, through other attainable channels of intelligence, the American newſpapers furniſhed ſufficient, being filled with the preparations making at Erie (Preſqu' Iſle). The Aurora of 29th June 1813, ſays, "The new ſloops of war lately built at Erie are noble veſſels, they are of the ſize of the Waſp and Hornet, each mounting eighteen 32 lb. carronades, and two long 12's. One is called the Lawrence, the other the Niagara." Again, Albany, July 1st, a letter from Erie, dated 20th June, 1813, mentions that "the Queen Charlotte and a Britiſh ſchooner are on the lake, and Capt. Perry has brought 5 veſ-

veſſels from Buffalo, which luckily eſcaped them in a fog. We have now 11 veſſels, two of which will carry 20 guns each." And Pittsburgh, July 21st—Extract of a letter from a gentleman at Erie, 19th inſt. "Our town is all buſtle; 5 of the enemy's veſſels are now within a mile and a half of the town; they appear full of men, and if they ſhould attempt a landing, I fear much, our militia, from their want of diſcipline, would make a very poor fight; Commodore Perry has not men ſufficient for a brig." Commodore Perry writes to the ſecretary of the navy, outſide Erie bar, 4th Auguſt 1813—"I have great pleaſure in informing you, that I have ſucceeded in getting over the bar the United States' veſſels the Lawrence, Niagara, Caledonia, Ariel, Scorpion, Somers, Tigreſs, and Porcupine. The enemy have been in ſight all day, and are now about four leagues from us; we ſhall ſail in purſuit of them at three to-morrow morning."

Now what excuſe can there be for Sir George in having quietly ſuffered all this to paſs in an open port, protected neither by troops nor fortifications up to Aug. 1813. Why did he not direct the means of attack upon that place, for the deſtruction of thoſe veſſels to be furniſhed, whilſt we commanded Lake Erie from the centre diviſion, which was lying inactive. Inſtead of this, he ſeems to have been blind to, or regardleſs of the increaſing means of deſtruction of our naval force upon that lake, as not an attempt

tempt was made to deſtroy the one or ſave the other.

At the period when Com. Perry wrote as above, the Detroit, our largeſt veſſel, was not equipped; and Capt. Barclay ſeeing the American force, very properly returned into port to get her ready. He made aſtoniſhing exertions with ſo great a deficiency of means, for he had neither proper guns, ſtores, nor ſeamen. To ſupply the former, Amherſtburg was diſmantled of its cannon and metal of eight different calibres thereby furniſhed: the like never happened before to a veſſel of one deck; and every ſeaman knows the ruinous conſequence of ſuch a motley mixture of guns. Some of thoſe guns although mounted upon carriages, were rather of the ſize of ſwivels, being 2 and 4 pounders; but unfortunately although inefficient as to defence or attack, they increaſed our nominal force and gave to the enemy an opportunity of ſwelling our relative ſtrength, without wounding their tender conſciences, as they gave the number of guns, omitting their ſize. The crews of all our veſſels were of a like motley compoſition, and not fifty Britiſh ſeamen were diſtributed amongſt the whole. The reſt were troops, landſmen, lake-ſailors, and militia; as to ſtores and equipment of all kinds, every ſuccedaneum was obliged to be employed in defect of what was proper.

It may be asked who is, or are to blame for this?

this? I anſwer, both Sir George and Sir James. The former then commanded both ſervices, and furniſhed, or ought to have furniſhed, the means, as moreover holding the purſe ſtrings of expenditure; and the latter was the naval chief commander upon the lakes, but ſeemed to have forgotten that he was reſponſible for lake Erie—each has much to anſwer for reſpecting it.

Seamen, unqueſtionably, were procurable at Quebec, either by energetic, voluntary, or compulſive means, if applied in due ſeaſon, to which an embargo would have greatly contributed, and might have been employed without commercial injury. It is afferted, that the late Capt. Kempt officially propoſed to Head Quarters in June 1813, a plan for ſecuring a ſupply of ſeamen for the lakes, but it was not liſtened to. It is alſo known, that he, and the commander of a ſloop of war, when the capture of the Growler and Eagle upon Lake Champlain was heard of, brought up that month, upon being applied to, a number of volunteer officers and ſeamen from that ſloop and tranſports, who went to Iſle aux Noix to man *thoſe captured veſſels*, for the purpoſe of proceeding upon ſome ſervice, along with troops upon that Lake, but they not being ready, the whole returned, until the like enterprize was reſumed by Col. Murray and Capt Everard as before mentioned. The ſame ſummer, Capt. M'Culloch of the Royal navy, an *Agent for Tranſports*, carried up a number of volunteer ſeamen therefrom, who ſerved upon

upon Lake Ontario, until November, when they returned to Quebec.

Can it be poſſible to adduce ſtronger proof of what was practicable in reſpect to manning our Lake Erie ſquadron, (had proper precautions been taken in due time) than the facts juſt mentioned.

But independent of theſe reſources, what good reaſon can be offered for *Sir James' conduct* in ſending up Capt. Barclay to that Lake with a handful of men, which were increaſed afterwards by ſo ſmall a number, and thoſe the refuſe of the Ontario crews; his own ſhips are ſaid to have been overmanned, and even if not ſo the ſeamen ſpared could have been replaced from below, whilſt the ſervice upon Lake Erie was going on.

I blame not, but on the contrary applaud, Sir James' prudence in acting on Lake Ontario upon the defenſive, againſt ſuch a ſuperiority of force, as Com. Chauncey had acquired; as he doubtleſs ſaved Upper Canada thereby; but when he determined upon defenſive operations, the motive was the ſtronger for affording to Captain Barclay the certainty of a victory through naval means upon Lake Erie, eſpecially when he ſaw that nothing was to be attempted by a land force, for the deſtruction of the enemy's increaſing fleet at Erie.

Had Capt. Barclay been furniſhed with a

ſufficient number of ſeamen for the veſſels he had, their cannot be a doubt, that even with the troops furniſhed him by General Proctor, the American Erie ſquadron would have been deſtroyed.

Yet under all theſe marked neglects by Sir George, we find him (as ſeems to have been a common practice with him in reſpect to the navy, althoughſo pointedly averſe to riſking any thing himſelf, or to permitting others to run any riſk by land) urging Captain Barclay to meet the enemy, as will appear by the letters read at General Proctor's trial, which I give merely from memory, but were in ſubſtance as follows, viz: In that from Sir George Prevoſt to General Proctor, in Auguſt 1813, he ſays, "the experience obtained by Sir James Yeo, reſpecting a fleet infinitely ſuperior to the one under his command, will ſatiſfy Captain Barclay, that he has only to *dare*," (alas, how little did the writer practise what he thus preached) "and the enemy will be discomfited," and a few days after, the Military Secretary writes, "His Excellency truſts that on the arrival of the ſeamen (meaning the handful ſent up) Capt. Barclay will be able to make his appearance on the Lake to meet the enemy." What inconſiſtency of conduct in *ſuch a character*, to uſe *ſuch language* to *ſuch men*, for it is well known, that neither Sir James Yeo, Captain Barclay, nor Capt. Downie wanted ſuch ſtimuli to do their duty; their perſonal temperament, and the ſtate of their armaments, ſeemed rather to require the ſuggeſtion of caution, in their proceedings. The

The ſtrange neglect of the Commiſſary on the Niagara line, who by an ill judged economy, * that has ſince coſt us ſo dear, loſt the opportunity of proviſioning the rig t diviſion, when practicable, which added to t' e above ſtimulants, and conjoined with Capt. Barclay's innate enterprize and zeal, led him to ſail on the 9th of Sept. 1813, from Amherſtburg, in the Detroit of 18 guns, with the Queen Charlotte of ſame number, ſo inadequately equipped and prepared, along with the Lady Prevoſt of 14, Hunter 8, Little Belt 2; and alſo a ſmall tender, the Chippeway of 1. The enemy had three large brigs, each ſuperior to the largeſt of our ſquadron, and 6 ſmaller veſſels.

The Commanders of the hoſtile fleets were aware of the importance of the ſtake for which they had to contend, and each did it ample juſtice. They got ſight of each other on the morning of the 10th Sept. and by a kind of ſimultaneous conſent, reſolved to meet, and try the iſſue. The lake was undulated by a gentle breeze, which at firſt favored us, but it veered

NOTE * This Gentleman afterwards when too late, paid one third more for flour, than he could have had it at in good season. Economy and inactivity at the commencement of a war, invariably lead to a waste of blood and treasure during its progress: never was this truism more completely exemplified, than in the practice of Sir George, in the late war. At the outset penurious to an extreme in every point of preparation for active operations; and inactive to a degree of torpidity, as if the enemy, by our forbearance, and by yielding to them the point of honor, could have been coaxed into peace; we have seen the expenditure of treasure and of life thereby quintupled. During the whole of the war, secret service money was so miserably applied, that our want of intelligence was proverbial. A contrary system might have produced real (instead of fictitious) savings to an immense amount.

round before the fleets came to action, and gave the enemy an opportunity of chooſing their diſtance, which they did, ſo as to give full effect to their ſuperiority in long guns, and to leſſen the effect of our carronades.

They had thus in their favor the ſuperiority of heavy metal; of ſize and number of veſſels, which diſcharged at each broadſide 340 lbs. of balls beyond ours; of number of regular bred ſeamen, and of general phyſical ſtrength; the exceſs of number of veſſels, enabled them to have a reſerve; a point of infinite moment.

In our favor, we had nought, to contend againſt ſuch odds, but the innate zeal and courage of our officers and men, the remembrance of former deeds, and the renown to be acquired in the event of ſucceſs; whilſt the forlorn neceſſity of the riſk run, would acquit them of diſhonor, if defeat ſhould enſue.

The fleets began to engage a quarter before noon, and at half paſt three the action ceaſed by our diſcomfiture. So gallantly did our inferior force maintain the fight, under the diſadvantage of a diſtance choſen by the enemy, that Com. Perry was obliged to quit the Lawrence, which ſoon after ſurrendered, but not a boat, an officer, nor a ſeamen had the Detroit left whereby to be able to take poſſeſſion. The *commodore* removed his broad pendant to the Niagara, which had kept aloof hitherto in the conteſt, when obſerving an opportunity for retriev-

al

al of the day, he carried down that veſſel, and the reſerve gun veſſels, to make a freſh attack upon our diſabled line ; unfortunately at this moment, the Queen Charlotte in wearing, in order to bring her other ſide to bear, came round upon the wrong tack, and nearing the Detroit, they (by that power of attraction incident to floating bodies, and which there was not phyſical ſtrength remaining in either of our veſſels, ſufficient to counteract ,) fell on board each other, and in this diſabled ſituation becoming an unmanageable and inert maſs, were attacked by the above ſaid freſh force of the enemy, and compelled to ſtrike.

From this detail, it will be obvious, that under all our diſadvantages, the victory was ſnatched from us by that unprecedented accident of being unable to take poſſeſſion of the Lawrence when ſhe ſtruck, and the equally extraordinary fatality of our loſs falling ſo heavily upon the few naval officers and ſeamen that we had ; for the 1ſt and 2d in command of each veſſel were killed or wounded, and that liſt otherwiſe diſtreſſingly numerous.

The gallant Barclay might ſay with Francis the 1ſt, after the battle of Pavia," that he had loſt all but his honor," for it was a conteſt ſupported by him in a ſtyle worthy of one who had ſerved under the immortal Nelſon, as he had done. Well might his appearance on his trial, draw tears from his Court Martial, mutilated as he

he was by the loſs of one arm, on a former occaſion ; and the other requiring artificial ſupport to be of any uſe, by reaſon of a grape ſhot through the ſhoulder blade, which grazed his ſide, beſides receiving ſeveral other fleſh wounds in the battle of 10th September.

But what ſeaman or ſoldier is there, who would not prefer ſuch mutilation, to the ſpurious honours which adulation confers, for the pretended ſaving of lives by the retreats of Sacketts Harbour and Plattſburg, thoſe diſtreſſing monuments of indeciſion.

The conſequences of the *loſs of that fleet* were, as was to be expected, very diſaſtrous indeed, it having reduced us to the neceſſity of abandoning all our poſitions beyond Lake Erie, and therewith riſking the loſs of Indian friendſhip, which indeed was threatened by them, with a view to induce us ſtill to make a ſtand ſomewhere in that quarter. The retreat commenced from Sandwich on the 24th of September, 1813, after finally diſmantling the forts of Amherſtburg and Detroit (already ſtripped of their artillery for our fleet,) and deſtroying the public buildings and ſtores. Our remaining force conſiſted probably of about 850 men, and 1200 to 1500 Indians, who ſtill adhered to us in adverſity. The whole took the route of the *River Thames*, followed by boats with ſome proviſions ſtores and baggage.

The enemy, under General Harriſon, appeared

peared off Amherſtburg on the 26th, and next day proceeding by water to that river; they, on reaching it, landed about 4500 men, or perhaps more, who being accompanied by water by ſome gun boats, they aſcended the Thames in the tract of General Proctor's corps, the rear guard whereof with the boats, ſtores and baggage, were come up with, and captured on the 4th of October. On the 5th, they alſo came up with the main body, near the Moravian village, whom they defeated, taking about 600 priſoners. General Proctor, with ſome officers and men, to the number of about 250 in all, firſt and laſt, eſcaped, and got to Ancaſter.

The Indians made a more ſucceſsful ſtand at another point, having obliged part of the enemy oppoſed to them to give way, whom they harraſſed in their return to Detroit; but loſing their great Chief, the celebrated Tecumseth, who fell like a Hero in the field of battle, and learning the fate of our troops, a large body of them retired in the ſame direction, and also aſſembled at Ancaſter.

The body of Tecumſeth having fallen into the hands of the Americans, it was literally in part flayed by them, with a ferocity diſgraceful to the name of soldiers and chriſtians; but it is an eſtabliſhed fact, that the back settlers of Kentucky, &c. are far more ſavage and cruel, than thoſe they affect to denominate savages.

I give no opinion about General Procter's retreat

treat and action, as he has been tried by his Peers, who will pass judgment according to evidence, but his conduct has been harshly spoken of, and especially in the general order of 24th November 1813, where there is a severity of reproof, that no officer, however high in rank, could be entitled to give to a General Officer, previous to any regular investigation; at least where his own military feats were either unheard of, or of trifling import. Yet, such is the limited nature of human foresight, that the language of that general order, which certainly in point of literary composition, was ably written, might, without a forced construction, be made to apply to Sir George's own case in September 1814.

The misfortune that thus befel the right division, had like to have proved fatal to the centre division. General Vincent, panic struck, retreated from St. David, (General De Rottenburg having some time before gone down to Kingston,) towards Burlington, after destroying quantities of stores, provisions, and Indian goods, and the post at Long Point was called in with precipitation, as if Harrison and his men could have come through the intermediate wilderness unimpeded, or without their advance, if attempted, being previously ascertained.

The infection of this panic extended to Head Quarters, from whence orders issued for the evacuation of all our posts beyond Kingston, and for the retreat of the troops to that place, which from

from a paragraph in an Albany paper, appeared to be known to the enemy, as ſoon or ſooner, than to General Vincent at Burlington.

The enemy confiding in the accuracy of their information, after advancing parties upon the route towards Burlington, and committing various ravages, as alſo after making demonſtrations at Niagara to convey under cover of their fleet a body of troops by boats into our rear, moved the principal part of their force ſuddenly down the lake to Sacket's harbor, the American Genl. there declaring, that he was not to be duped by the appearance of our building barracks at Burlington, as he knew the orders which had been given for the retreat of the Britiſh troops in that quarter, and that the advanced guard had in conſequence already proceeded to York.

The execution of thoſe orders for retreat was repeatedly urged from below, and at laſt in ſo peremptory a manner, that they would have been carried into effect, had not the ſtrong and zealous remonſtrances of ſome officers of rank, interpoſed to prevent a meaſure ſo pregnant with ruin. It will ſcarcely be believed, but is not the leſs true, that in thoſe orders, no notice was taken either of the ſick, of which there was then a large number with the army, and a larger at York, nor of the inhabitants or Indians, neither was the depot of proviſions and ſtores deemed worthy of notice, although the poſts of Burlington, York, and Kingſton depended principally on that depot for ſupplies.

In addition to thoſe gloomy conſiderations, the ſeaſon of the year, and ſtate of the roads preſented inſurmountable obſtacles to the execution of thoſe orders, without the ſacrifice of all the ordnance, ammunition, ſtores, and baggage of every deſcription.

And admitting that one half of the effective regular force could have reached Kingſton, which was by no means probable, what was to have become of the civil officers of Government, and their families, with all the other loyal inhabitants reſident in the Diſtrict to be evacuated.

Suppoſing that thoſe alſo could have reached Kingſton, and that the Indians would have allowed them to depart, (the Indians however in ſuch caſe, on ſeeing themſelves deceived and abandoned to their fate, would more probably, from the impulſe of deſpair, have plundered, burnt and deſtroyed every thing within their reach) what muſt have been the conſequenee? when it is well known that the garriſon of Kingſton, about that time, had *only ſeven day's proviſion in ſtore*, and that ſupplies were forwarded thereto from Burlington and York at an immenſe expence and risk.

Under ſuch circumſtances, Kingſton muſt have been alſo abandoned, for want of ſubſiſtence, and the ſhips, ſtores, and public buildings deſtroyed or left to the enemy.

A retreat from thence to Montreal, under an accumulatiou of diſtreſs and difficulty augmenting

ing at every ſtep from the ſtate of the roads, and the number of wretched inhabitants compelled to fly from fear of the enemy, and a dread of the exaſperated Indians, would have produced horrors, ſufficient to appal the ſtouteſt minds.

To all this may be added, the certainty that a large force of the enemy would have been brought to hang upon the flanks and rear of ſuch a cavalcade, (for an army it could not have been called) so that such a panic would have been created in the country, as to have rendered reſistance to the descent of the enemy to Montreal unavailing.

None but thoſe who were directed to carry those orders into execution, and who in conſequence had the subject pressed upon their conſideration under all its direful bearings, can form a proper estimate of the heart rending scene that such a retreat would have presented to view.

We therefore owe a debt of gratitude and regard of no common magnitude, to those officers, who at their own responsibility and risk, remonstrated with effect, against the fatal measure; and not only prevented the calamities which would have been consequent thereupon, but became ultimately the cause of clearing that country of the enemy, by the recapture of Fort George, and capture of Fort Niagara, with all their happy results.

And yet the man who gave the orders aforeſaid

said, is addressed as the saviour of the Canadas. It may be truly said, that they have been saved in spite of his blunders, and defect of exertion.

VERITAS.

Montreal, 9th May, 1815.

No. VI.

[NO. VI.]

To the Editor of the Montreal Herald

SIR,

In my laſt number, I stated, that at one time, in autumn, 1813, our troops at Kingſton had not seven days subsistence. Thoſe at Prescott or Fort Wellington, were nearly in a similar situation.

This was in a great measure, owing to a combination of persons, either in the pay of Madiſon, or gratuitously promoting his service. They effected their purpoſe partly by their own example, and by operating upon the avarice of the well affected, by persuading them to withhold supplies in order to get excessive prices. This was the ostensible pretext, but the real motive was to disconcert our military operations, by starving the troops, at the time of the expected invasion, by the force collecting at Sackett's Harbour.

To counteract this nefarious plot, it became indispensably necessary for General De Rottenburg, then President of Upper Canada, to proclaim a modified Martial Law; and in consequence, provisions and forage were taken from the Farmers, without their consent; but at very liberal

liberal and indeed very high prices, fixed by the Magistrates; the one half of which they would now be happy to get. Many who were duped by the arts of the disaffected, now feel compunction and sorrow at their folly.

This measure of General De Rottenburg created complaints, which were artfully laid hold of by a Junto of disaffected persons, but self styled patriots, who seeing their object likely to be defeated by this prompt and decided measure, became furious in their denunciations against the military in general, but especially General De Rottenburg and Lieutenant Colonel Pearson, who then commanded at Prescott.

The Chief of this Junto, was a man who had quitted Prescott the moment he heard of war being declared, and came to reside at Montreal, either from cowardice, or as considering it to afford a wider field for exertions favorable to the views of the enemy. He began his career by libelling every class in this community, and afterwards attacked the officers abovesaid, for doing their duty, in a periodical essay, under the signature of the "Anti-Jacobin," which was at first published in the Courant, but the Editor getting alarmed, at the abusive matter it contained; the work was taken up by a wretched Paper called the Spectateur, that had commenced operations upon a congenial plan.

This paper yet continues, but is dwindling into deserved insignificance. The Anti-Jacobin

bin * has some time dropped his signature, but occasionally deigns to enlighten his fellow subjects with the fruits of his brain, under occasional signatures, or under the mask of editorial remarks.

It would occupy too large a space, to enter into a formal discussion of the question about the right of declaring Martial Law, and therefore I shall content myself with observing, that to argue that such a power can in *no case be exercised, without a previous Legislative Act*, is as absurd as to say, that an individual has not the right of self preservation if attacked, but must, instead of defending himself, apply to the civil magistrate *for protection*, and consequently risk *being destroyed* before he can obtain *that protection*.

General laws apply to ordinary cases, but there are cases that require extraordinary and prompt remedies. Rebellion or invasion assuredly come within the latter class, and during the existence of either of them, or absolute danger thereof, martial-law may be constitutionally proclaimed by the Sovereign or his Representative ; and to do so, may be as indispensable to the safety of the state, as the instant application of personal force to the preservation of an individual when attacked.

* The part of this number which relates to Martial Law, and the plan for starving the troops in Upper Canada, was written before I saw *the letter* in the last Herald, sent from Leeds ; but *it* comes in as a most powerful illustration of my doctrine thereon.

That

That the application of the power abovesaid was not made upon a trivial occasion, is manifest; for the question was reduced to this—Shall the army be starved at the time the enemy is known to be prepared for, and determined upon immediate invasion? or shall an authority be exercised to defeat the plots of the disaffected, and thereby save the Province against that invasion? *So certainly* will every honest and loyal man say *yes*, to the second part of the question, that I venture to assert, that in such a predicament had the officer at the head of the Government, been so neglectful of his duty, as to be dismayed into inaction, by democratic clamour or threats, he would have deserved condign punishment.

General De Rottenburg, I conceive, was perfectly *justified* in what he did, from the necessity of the case, and Lieutenant Colonel Pearson in obeying his orders, was *also so;* and I have been astonished to learn, that Sir George Prevost, upon finding that the Lieut. Colonel was daily abused and threatened with prosecutions and persecutions by the disaffected Junto, for his zeal in executing his orders about subsisting the troops, coolly observed, that if he had got into a scrape, let him get out of it the best way he can. Sir George's duty was to have enquired whether the Lieutenant Colonel had acted from corrupt motives, or from zeal in a necessary measure, and if the latter, it was incumbent upon the Commander of the Forces to have supported him.

I have a right to ascribe the conduct of the Junto to disaffection; for what good subject, when the enemy was at the door, would have taken measures to palsy our means of defence. To give aid to the enemy, is treason, and what more efficient aid could be given, than what I have mentioned. It only wanted proof of a correspondence with the enemy, respecting those proceedings, to have made those concerned therein, punishable for High Treason.

The enemy had been for some months collecting a force at Plattsburg for a second invasion of Lower-Canada, and in September advanced to the frontier, as if intending at one time, to penetrate by Odell-Town, and at another by the Chateaugay and Salmon Rivers. The Sedentary Militia to the south of the St. Lawrence, for a considerable way down, were then called out to aid the regular troops and embodied militia in repelling the attempt. The enemy after several demonstrations and countermarches, entered by the Chateaugay country, and having advanced under General Hampton, with nearly 8000 men, on the 26th of Oct. 1813, attacked our advanced post, consisting of about 300 men, under the immediate command of Lieutenant Colonel De Salaberry, who had chosen his ground and strengthened it by abbatis, with such judgment, and defended it with such spirit, as to repulse, according to the General Order on the occasion, a body of above twenty times their number. The force under

the Lieut. Col. was chiefly Canadians, and they acquitted themſelves in a manner that does him, the other officers, and them, great credit.

The loſs we ſuſtained was trifling, but that of the enemy pretty ſevere, and retreating without renewing their attack, they returned to Plattsburg. Upon this, a queſtion ariſes, which inſtead of being favorable to Sir George's claim to the merit of calling forth the energies of the population, rather proves that he repreſſed thoſe energies; becauſe we know the fact, that the enemy were defeated, (whether they had as many in action as alledged, or not;) and then allowed quietly to retire without purſuit: why were they not followed up, by the very large body of other militia and regular troops in that quarter? The not following them up was an inſult to the other troops and militia, after what 300 *only* had done.

Did Sir George want confidence in himself, or in them, or from what other cauſe did ſo ſtrange a neglect proceed? If his other force was not within ſupporting or ſtriking distance, what can be ſaid of his military talents? and why was he ſo deficient in intelligence of the enemy's movements, as not to have had a body concentrated and ready on the instant to take advantage of this ſucceſs? In ſhort I am bewildered on the occaſion, if he really believed to the extent of what he publiſhed, as alſo at the order iſſued on the 4th of November, for the diſmiſſal

diſmiſſal of the Sedentary Militia on the ſouth ſide, in conſequence of which ſome of them, on the 7th or 8th had begun their march homeward, when next day they had to be countermarched, to repel another invaſion from a different quarter. However, ſuch was the fact.

The American expedition collected at Sackett's Harbour, under General Wilkinson, becoming formidable in October, and Kingſton being ſuppoſed to be its object, both fleets had come down the Lake.—Ours entered Kingſton Harbour, and there remained, when part of the crews were diſtributed into gun-boats, under the command of Captain Mulcaſter, of the Royal Navy, to watch the enemy's movements. The invading army left Sackett's Harbour in that month, in above 200 Durham boats, gun-boats, and ſmall craft, containing ten thouſand men of all deſcriptions, with a large train of artillery, and abundance of ſtores. Meeting with ſtormy weather after ſailing, they ſuffered loſs, and rendezvouſed at Grenadier Island, where they remained expoſed to very bad weather, in a rainy ſeaſon, until the 3d Nov. 1813, when they again ſailed, and proceeded down. On the 7th at night, (notwithſtanding they had been on a former day cannonaded by Captain Mulcaſter's flotilla) their boats and craft paſſed Preſcott, cloſe to the American ſhore, moſt of the troops having landed above, and marched round, to avoid the expected cannonade from Fort Wellington.

On

On the 8th, 5000 men under General Boyd paſſed over at Point Iroquois to the Canada ſide, 15 miles below Preſcott, where he was joined by 300 American Dragoons, who had croſſed at Hamilton ; Gene al Wilkinſon with their remaining force being then in their boats. When it was found that their object was not Kingſton, but Lower Canada, after their departure from Grenadier Iſland, Lt. Colonel Morriſon was ſent from Kingſton with the 49th and 89th Regiments, which joined our flotilla of gun-boats, and proceeding down, were reinforced as they paſſed Fort Wellington, with a part of its garriſon, under Lieutenant Colonel Pearſon ; the 49th was commanded by Lieutenant Col. Plenderleath, all of them diſtinguiſhed officers. Upon approaching the enemy, our force landed and overtook them on the 9th, after which, their rear was ſo harraſſed as to determine Gen. Boyd to retrograde with 4000 men on he 11th, and attack us, whilſt General Brown, with the reſt of their disembarked troops, marched on.

Lieutenant Colonel Morriſon obſerving this, retired until he came to a poſition ſelected on his way down, in caſe of ſuch an event, where he determined to receive their attack. A battle enſued, and the enemy were beaten in a maſterly manner, with a ſevere loſs in killed and wounded, and 400 men captured with a field piece.

Colonel Morriſon and the other officers and men

men under his command, had uncommon merit in conquering under ſuch a diſproportion of force, as he had in all but 800 men; and the modeſt ſtyle in which he related the action, enhanced that merit when put in contrast with the bombast of the enemy. Captain Mulcaſter and his gun-boats moſt zealouſly co-operated, and had a ſhare in producing the defeat. The enemy upon this, retreated rapidly down the river, and would have been deſtroyed or taken, if we had had the good fortune to have had the 19th Light Dragoons there on the occaſion. Our troops continued to follow them.—General Brown had met reſiſtance in front from ſome militia, who being obliged to retire, the whole of the enemy came on and united at Cornwall, where hearing that the Glengary militia, commanded by Major Dennis of the 49th, were collecting in force upon their flank, whilſt Col. Morriſon was preſſing their rear; they got alarmed, and haſtily croſſed over on the 13th of Nov. to the American ſide at St. Regis, and then proceeded to Salmon River, on the ſouth ſide of Lake St. Francis, which they aſcended with all their boats and craft as high as the French Mills. Thus ended the third attempt at invaſion of the Lower Province, which they had prepared for at immenſe expence.

In their march down through a part of Upper Canada, they did much miſchief, which would have been ſtill greater, but for the alarm they were in; and which alarm increaſed as they advanced,

advanced, on finding the population in that quarter univerſally hoſtile to them. They on this expreſſed a ſenſe of their error, in not having landed in Auguſta, where they knew they had numerous friends.

In the General Order and official letter of Sir George, he ſays that Lieut. Colonel Morriſon, with a corps of obſervation, and the gun boats followed in purſuance of *his* order ; but this is doubted by many, and by ſuch conſidered as one of thoſe turns habitually given by him to *any thing fortunate*, as if emanating from *his arrangements*. Be that as it may, it is thought by many, that had a corps of marines (part of two batts. that arrived from Halifax at Quebec in October) whowere at the time on their march to Cornwall and Preſcott, not been recalled to Coteau du Lac ; they in conjunction with the Glengary militia, would have given a good account of General Boyd's diviſion. For this counter order, I do not think that Sir George is to blame, as he could not divine that the enemy, inſtead of keeping afloat, and deſcending rapidly, would loſe time by landing upon the Upper Canada ſide and marching.

His uſual unfortunate indeciſion however ſtept in to ſave the enemy on this occaſion in another way, for if Colonel Scott with our force then at Coteau du Lac, along with Lt. Colonel Morriſon and his troops, and Capt. Mulcaſter's flotilla, been ordered or allowed (for it is ſaid

that

that permiſſion was even aſked) to proceed immediately to Salmon river, they (the enemy) were then in ſo diſheartend and huddled-together a condition, that the whole or the greater part of them, would probably have been taken or deſtroyed ; or at all events, every thing afloat.

Inſtead of this, they were allowed to enter that river and diſembark in quiet, with all their cannon, ſtores, and proviſions, and take up a poſition which (by that ſpecies of induſtry that American troops poſſeſs in a high degree, of cutting down trees and forming block houſes and abattis therewith, eſpecially when ſpurred on by a ſenſe of their own immediate preſervation) was ſoon rendered formidable. They however did not feel at eaſe, for in Feb. 1814, as ſoon as the winter roads became practicable for the conveyance of their cannon and ſtores to Plattſburgh by the Four Corners, they ſent them off, when the troops in part marched thither, and the reſt under General Brown to Sackett's Harbour, after burning their huts, block houſes, and water craft to a certain degree, being partly ſunk, which was afterwards completed by us. Colonels Scott and Morriſon, with parties from Coteau du Lac and Cornwall, went over and made a circuit by Malone and Four Corners, from whence they returned to their former quarters, after ſending in ſome proviſions ; but nothing was effected to compenſate for the caſualties incurred during the expedition.

The

The proceedings at Montreal conſequent upon a knowledge of Wilkinſon's deſcent, remain to be deſcribed. Early on the morning of the 9th November that information was firſt had, by an officer from Fort Wellington, who ſtated that the Army had paſſed it on the night of the 7th, and as it was full moon and clear weather, the apprehenſion was, that the enemy would puſh on night and day, and be almoſt at the heels of the bearer of the intelligence.

The diſmiſſal of the militia on the other ſide of the river, was inſtantly countermanded, and expreſſes ſent to recall thoſe whoſe march homeward had commenced. The whole of the militia on the north ſide from Three-Rivers upwards, were ordered out, and the Montreal Volunteers with the three Sedentary Town Battalions, marched in the afternoon for La Chine and towards Pointe Claire, and in the night took up quarters along the St. Lawrence, from the upper part of the Pariſh of La Chine extending downwards, their right being upon the left of a corps of marines which had marched in the forenoon, and were halted higher up. Some of the militia of the adjoining pariſhes, were poſted from the right of the marines to the end of the Iſland. Upon the morning of the 9th Nov. orders were alſo diſpatched to the Meuron Regt. and other corps, to march to the village of Caughnawago and its neighborhood.

The country battalions of militia as they arrived

ved in town were classed by Col. M'Gill, to whom the command here at that period was confided, and those fit for service were armed, equipped, and marched on by battalions to different positions, whilst men infirm, or beyond a certain age, were sent home.

In this order, the attack was waited for, and the enemy expected speedily to appear; when to the general surprise, nothing farther was heard of them until the 13th, when the joyful news of the battle of Chrystler's farm was received.

About this time, a body of seamen for the Lakes, and the 70th Regt. arrived at Quebec. The whole of the former and part of the latter were pushed on to Montreal by the Steam Boat, a mode of conveyance of such certainty and celerity, as to have been highly useful to the public service, during the war, and beneficial to the proprietor.

Sir George was at La Chine during all these operations, and shortly after the reception of the enemy having entered Salmon River, ordered the militia to return to their respective abodes, commencing their march on the 18th Nov. and in succession of time, so as to admit of passing through Montreal, on different days, and depositing their arms and ammunition. All this was done with regularity and good humour, and throughout the whole, never did any people evince greater alacrity, which I am informed they

would ever have done, and ever will do, if not perverted by the machinations of some factious and reſtleſs agitators.

Let us revert to Upper Canada, and the circumſtance under which the intended retreat to Kingſton was at firſt avoided in autumn 1813, and finally countermanded. The delay of that retreat (the order for which was unknown at the time to individuals) and the departure of the chief force of the enemy from the Niagara frontier for Sacket's Harbour, (the laſt whereof was General Harriſon with his people, who had re-embarked and come down from Detroit by water) renovated confidence amongſt the troops and inhabitants about Burlington, who had been ſuffering moſt ſeverely, but now began to wiſh for a reſumption of the offensive, although inconſiſtent with the orders from Head Quarters, and in conſequence unpalatable to General Vincent, who although a good man in private life, was alarmed at public reſponſibility.

The Inhabitants at this time repreſented to him the ravages committing by the American Genl. M'Clure, and that with a moderate regular and Indian force *to aid them*, this gang of deſtroyers and plunderers might be driven off, and the crops of the country ſaved for public and private uſe. This repreſentation was ſeconded, if not inſtigated by Col. Murray, who pledged himſelf for the ſucceſs of the meaſure ſo ſuggeſted; and a Corps being put under his orders, its advance had

had an inſtantaneous effect upon M'Clure, then about the 20 mile creek. Col. Murray's permiſſion at firſt was confined to the 40 mile; then upon a freſh repreſentation from him of its ſucceſs, it was extended to the 20 mile, and afterwards to the 12 mile creek; which he was upon no account to paſs; but upon arriving there, and finding that M'Clure was in ſuch a panic, that immediate advance would probably drive the American deſtroyers to their own ſide, and ſave Newark, he wrote to General Vincent accordingly, but in the mean time made a rapid movement upon Fort George, before it could be ſanctioned or forbidden.

This effected the expulſion of M'Clure, who precipitately abandoned Fort George, (and fled acroſs the river with his men) without deſtroying it, but after moſt barbarouſly and atrociously (I recollect no epithet of ſufficient force to expreſs the infamy of the act) burning at night, on the 10th of December, 1813, the town of Newark, and turning out into the open air (the ground then covered with snow) some hundreds of families, without proviſions or covering, to ſeek ſhelter at a diſtance. That miscreant during his command, was counſelled by a traitor of the name of Wilcocks, and both exulted in practiſing every kind of miſchief againſt the loyal part of the inhabitants, whoſe houſes and barns, in many inſtances before, they had burnt or pillaged.

Early on the 12th Col. Murray entered Fort George, in ſight of the ſtill ſmoking ruins of Newark; Lieut. Genl. Drummond and Major Genl. Riall had arrived from England early in November, but remained in the Lower Province upon ſervice, whilſt Wilkinſon's invaſion was pending; but when that was over, they proceeded to the Upper Province; General Drummond, as originally intended, relieved General De Rottenburg in the military command, and in the preſidency of that Province, whereupon the latter came down to Montreal. Staying a ſhort time at Kingſton, they went on to York, where General Drummond being ſworn into office, they proceeded to the army above, and reached Fort George ſoon after its recapture. Col. Murray had planned a favorite ulterior operation, which Genl. Drummond happily had the manlineſs to ſanction, without permiſſion from Head Quarters. Accordingly all preparations for it being ready, the troops for the enterprise croſſed the Niagara river ſome miles above, in the night between the 18th and 19th of December 1813; when the diviſion thereof under Col. Murray, intended for the attack of Fort Niagara, proceeded downwards, and an hour before day light on the 19th, it was carried by aſſault, with the bayonet alone.

The bold and daring features of the plan were followed by the moſt happy execution, which verified the favorite military adage of "*fortuna favet fortibus.*"

The

The force under Col. Murray, consisted of about 560 men, composed of the 100th Regt. commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton, with the Grenadier company of the Royal Scots, and flank companies of the 41st. also some militia, the latter under Col. Kirby ; all behaved like heroes. The forlorn hope was led by Lieut. Dawson of the 100th. In the advance two pickets were surprised and cut off or captured, before they could give any alarm, the Sentries on the Glacis at the Gate were killed or taken, from one of whom the countersign was obtained, before the enemy were apprised of their danger; at the moment they discovered their situation, the gate was forced, whilst a party that had been sent round to another quarter, scaled the pickets of the Fort; the garrison being quartered in stone buildings, a severe but short contest ensued, when they surrendered, with the loss of 80 killed and wounded, and 350 prisoners.— Our loss did not exceed 10, including the gallant commander, who was wounded, and Lt. Nowland 100th killed ; 27 pieces of ordnance, with a large quantity of stores, small arms, and provisions, were found in the fort.

The other division of the force which landed, was under General Riall, and consisted of detachments of the Royal Scots and 41st Regiment with a body of Indians, who drove the enemy from Lewis Town heights, and advancing upwards on the south side of the Niagara river to Fort Schloffer (which they destroyed) went

as

as far as Tonewanto creek, where finding the bridge broken down, they returned and recrossed to Queenston, having previously in retaliation for the fate of Newark, burnt the villages of Lewistown and Manchester, with all the buildings near their line of march.

On the 30th of December before day light, General Riall with about 1000 men crossed over below Fort Erie, and attacked Black Rock, defended by 2000 American militia under General Hall, who soon gave way † and were pursued to Buffaloe, where they attempted to make a stand, but speedily fled with such precipitation to the 11 mile Creek, that we only made in all about 70 prisoners.—Our loss was 75 killed and wounded, theirs probably not much greater.

We brought off some stores and destroyed the remainder at Black Rock and Buffaloe, which villages with four small vessels, frozen up, were burnt.—The troops then returned to our side, and went into peaceable winter quarters.

General Drummond was present at the points of embarkation, and actively employed in preparing those expeditions, and giving orders for their execution.

The events just described, come pointedly in proof,

† Capt. Robinson of the King's Regt. now Major by Brevet, is said to have greatly contributed to this by an opportune movement of that brave corps made when the command devolved upon him, by Lt. Colonel Ogilvie being wounded.

proof of what zeal and enterprise can effect, and how little loss sometimes attends the most hazardous attempts, whilst military inactivity and indecision, prey upon the Soldiers minds, generate discontent, and promote desertion.

It is extraordinary, that any part of the merit of the above operation should have been claimed by Sir George ; yet on reference to the General Order of 12th January, 1814, on the burning of Newark and consequent retaliation it will be found to be more than insinuated therein, that *such retaliation* (assuredly not more severe than a sense of justice and protection to our own subjects) was by *his order* ; whereas it is well known, that the time which elapsed between the recapture of Fort George and the commencement of retaliation by us, did not admit of the receipt of *an order from Head Quarters, then at Quebec*, on the subject.

The general belief is, (reasoning from prior and posterior events) that had the intention of assaulting Fort Niagara and of retaliation for the burning of Newark been known to him, he would have given orders to prevent both, as being far too hazardous.

I shall close this number with noticing the capture of a band of Traitors (who had joined the enemy and assisted in their depredations) by a party of Loyal Militia of the Country of Oxford, under Lieut. Col. Bostwick.—These ungrateful wretches, were Americans who had taken

ken the oaths to his Majesty, and had been settled many years in that quarter of Upper Canada, where many of them had acquired a good deal of property, and experienced the like protection and favor as other subjects.

They were afterwards tried at Ancaster for High Treason, 15 whereof were convicted, and 8 executed, the remainder being reprieved, to await the Prince Regent's decision, in respect to their final fate.

General Hull's exterminating Proclamation on his entrance into Upper Canada, at Sandwich, in 1812, wherein he so confidently speaks of conquest, relying upon the friendship of the multitude of American settlers in that Province, is illustrated by the conduct of those men, when they thought that the American arms would prevail —Such facts should operate as a lasting momento to us, of the dangerous policy of admitting natives of the States to hold lands in either Province. *VERITAS.*

Montreal, May 17th, 1815.

[NO. VII.]

To the Editor of the Montreal Herald

SIR,

Having in a former number ſaid, that the diſaſter to our fleet upon Lake Erie, had obliged us to abandon all our poſts beyond that Lake, I omitted to add, with the exception of Michilimakinac.

It however muſt have fallen, if an attack had been made thereon in autumn 1813, but neglecting to do ſo, it was ſaved. That poſt, at all times valuable as a point of communication with the weſtern Indians, now became doubly ſo, from the recent misfortunes upon Lake Erie; for had it been loſt, the whole of the Indian nations, muſt from neceſſity, not choice, (for we are their natural allies and friends from unity of intereſts) have ſubmitted to the Americans, although their implacable enemies. The conſequences might have been fatal to all the country beyond Kingſton, as the enemy, by the command of Lakes Erie and Huron, in ſuch caſe, would have encircled that country, as it were upon three ſides, and rendered its defence by us impracticable.

Sir George for once acted with decision, by providing during the winter of 1813, near Lake Huron, the means of conveying a reinforcement to Michilimakinac, early in the spring; which reinforcement, and the command afterwards of that post, he confided to Lieut Col. M'Douall, an officer of zeal and intelligence, who acquitted himself with such judgment and diligence, in increasing the defences of the place, and in supplying and husbanding provisions for his garrison, as to defy the attack of the enemy, who appeared there in July, and on the 4th of Aug. 1814, landed 1000 men. These were repulsed and drove on board their vessels by a small number of Indians, with considerable loss, before the garrison, (owing to a false rumour that a landing was making in their rear) could co-operate, else the whole would have been killed or taken.

The Indians on this occasion, behaved with exemplary zeal and fidelity in our cause; and indeed their attachment throughout has been such as to make me blush for my country, in the direliction of their interests in the negociations at Ghent, after so many promises made them, and so fair a prospect at the commencement of those negociations. A detachment of the American fleet which attacked Michilimakinac, had previously pillaged and burnt all the private houses and buildings at Saint Mary's, the North West Company's inclusive; which coupled with the uniform proceedings of the enemy in Upper Canada, proves it to have proceeded from

from syſtematic inſtructions of the American Government, to deſtroy private property. The American Major Holmes, who commanded at the deſtruction and pillage of Saint Mary's, was guilty of a piece of ſuch ſavage atrocity, as to deſerve being noticed, as it is atteſted by perſons of credit, who were eye witneſſes of the fact. After employing a horſe and cart during the day to convey away the plunder, they in the evening, tied the former to a houſe, in ſuch manner as not to be able to escape, and then ſet fire to it, when the poor animal was burnt to death, whilſt the American troops were looking on, and enjoying the ſcene with a fiend like ſatisfaction. All the cattle, garden ſtuff, and other proviſions which they could not carry off, they deſtroyed, with a view to ſtarve thoſe who eſcaped from their clutches; and let it be remembered, there was not a military man, or men in public employment, or article belonging to the public there of any kind. The brutal Holmes was killed in the attack upon Michilimakinac afterwards.

One of the great objects of this expedition was to get hold of the North Weſt FURS which fortunately eſcaped.

A Lieutenant of the Royal Navy, and about 20 ſeamen formed part of the reinforcement ſent with Lt. Col. M'Douall. These manned the Nancy Schooner, which was armed, and employed to tranſport proviſions for the garriſon,

but obliged to be deſtroyed, to prevent her capture by the American fleet. Lieut. Worſley had afterwards a brilliant retaliation, having with his handful of ſeamen in boats, aided by Lieut. Bulger, and ſome troops in boats furniſhed from the garriſon, moſt gallantly boarded the American armed Schooner Tigreſs, of 1 long 24 pr. and a 12, and carried her ſword in hand. With her, they ſome days afterwards carried the Scorpion, of 1 long 24 pounder. Each had 30 men.

Colonel M'Douall detached Major M'Kay, of the Michigan Fencibles, with a small force, to Prairie des Chiens; where, aided by the Indians and a ſmall 3 pounder field piece, he took the American Fort, mounting 6 guns, and flanked by a large gun boat, carrying alſo a conſiderable number. Major M'Kay's exertions ſaved the Americans captured by him from the Indians, who had before been outraged by them, but not one has had the juſtice or candour ſince to publiſh the fact. It is a wonder, they did not proclaim that he had scalped the whole.

On the 4th of May 1814, our fleet under Sir James Yeo, ſailed from Kingſton with General Drummond, and 800 troops on board, excluſive of ſeamen and marines; and appearing off Oſwego, landed ſome of each claſs, who carried the Fort by aſſault, with a loſs to us of about 90 killed and wounded. A captain of marines was among the former, and that moſt valuable Naval Officer

Officer Capt. Mulcaſter, was ſo ſeverely wounded, as to have been considered incapable of future ſervice, but he has happily recovered. We captured and deſtroyed 12 pieces of ordnance, and ſome ſtores, burnt the barracks, diſmantled the fort, and brought off a schooner and ſome boats with ordnance, naval, and other ſtores.

The enemy loſt about 100 killed and wounded, and 60 priſoners. We failed however in the material object, as the principal ſtores for the American fleet were at the Onondago falls.

Had Fort Oswego been occupied and kept for the ſummer, it is generally ſuppoſed that the enemy could not have tranſported ſtores by land, to equip their fleet that ſeaſon ; but a far more certain object would have been, to have attacked Sacket's Harbour itſelf, for the purpoſe of destroying the fleet and depôt, and then to have abandoned it.

Such a prize was worth contending for at almost any riſk, and at that time eſpecially, as the garriſon was weak, from the moſt efficient part of it under General Brown having gone to Buffalo.

This did not eſcape obſervation, as it is believed upon good grounds, that an application was actually made to Sir George for a force adequate to this ſervice ; but it was refuſed. Ever ſince he let that place ſlip through his fingers in 1813, when in his power, he ſeems to have viewed it

(Sacket's,)

(Sacket's) with such a species of horror, as to have resolved on never again attempting it himself, or allowing any other officer to do so.

The repeated neglect of *that grand object*, has been the source of all our misfortunes. In the present case, we had a disposable force, adequate to the enterprise, had it been undertaken, as there could have been spared from Lower Canada, at that time (spring 1814) the 2d battn. King's Regt, the 70th, and De Meurons, besides one or two other corps, which with the garrison of Kingston, and such number of Upper Canada militia and Indians as could have been made useful upon such an expedition, when aided by our fleet, then superior to the enemy's, could not have failed of success.

There would have still remained in Lower Canada, the 6th battn. Embodied Militia (with Sedentary if needful) to do the duty of Quebec; and in Montreal district, the 13th and 49th regts (if not sent upwards,) a battalion of marines, Canadian Fencible Regt, Voltigeurs, five strong battalions of Embodied Militia, the 19th Dragoons, one squadron excepted, and a respectable Artillery force. Exclusive of these, any number of Sedentary militia could have been had, if necessary; for it is well known that the enemy had then no intention of invading Lower Canada, because they were collecting their whole force against the Niagara frontier, as every body believed, but Sir George, who persisted in his credulity

credulity to the laſt, from no other visible cauſe, than that it would have interfered with the *grand Camp of inſtruction* about to be formed. Excluſive of all the above Corps, there were reinforcements daily expected by ſea, some of which arrived in May at Quebec.

Will either Sir George, or the admirers of his military talents, dare to inſinuate the degrading idea, that the Embodied Militia were not to be conſidered effective, after ſo many complimentary orders iſſued, and the actual experience of the Chateaugay conteſt? yet th y muſt either do ſo, or admit that he was grossly neglectful of his duty. Really one would ſuppose, from the negative ſervice on which the embodied militia was generally employed by him, that he intended them for mere parade, or to be kept in the back ground. It has been frequently said, and meant as a compliment to Sir George, that the militia *did under him* what *they would not have done under any other Governor.* This compliment is a falſe and scandalous libel upon the militia, for, otherwiſe it would imply that their attachment was not to *the Government*, but to *the Governor*; but I am fully perſuaded, that any Governor of energy, with the like opportunities that he had, would have turned the militia of this country to far more valuable account, and furniſhed moſt poſitive proofs of what I aſſert.

Our fleet after returning from Oſwego, and diſembarking the troops at Kingſton, was em-

ployed

ployed in blockading Sacket's Harbour, and scouring the coaſt, particularly towards Oſwego. Upon this ſervice, Capts. Popham and Spilsbury being employed with a flotilla of 2 boats, carrying guns, and ſome ſmaller craft, the crews whereof amounted to about 180 men, had intelligence or got ſight of an American convoy of boats from Oſwego, bound to Sacket's, with guns, anchors, cables, and all kinds of ſtores for their fleet, which convoy took refuge in Sandy Creek. Our flotilla unfortunately entered after them, when they were found to be protected by a body of Riflemen, militia and Indians, in a ſituation highly favorable to them, and moſt unfavorable to us. The conſequence was, that after a ſharp but moſt unequal conflict, the whole of our boats, officers, and men were killed or taken. Our loſs in killed and wounded was 70, but the enemy from their ſituation ſuffered almoſt nothing.

This misfortune created at that time a gloomy ſenſation. It was certainly imprudent to enter the creek, as our people were thereby placed in a ſituation where neither courage nor naval skill could avail, againſt their inviſible foe; but as the object had it been attainable, was great, and this imprudence, the effect of an exceſs of zeal in the ſervice whereon they were employed, what good ſubject can cenſure the motive, however much he may regret the iſſue? The blockade of Sacket's Harbour being ſoon raiſed, the enemy continued to get forward by water, the guns

guns and ſtores for their fleet, and regained the command of Lake Ontario, from July to October 1814.

Towards spring, 1814, ſo inveterate was Sir George's rage for armiſtices, notwithſtanding the injurious conſequences of the former to the military ſervice, that a negociation for another was ſet on foot, and defeated ſolely from the refuſal of our Admiral on the American ſtation to concur in it. The Americans gave out that the propoſition came from Sir George, which I believe, becauſe otherwiſe he would have met it at once, by a direct negative, that would have ended all diſcuſſion on the ſubject.

In January 1814, whilſt the Legiſlature was ſitting at Quebec, Sir George made a trip to Montreal from no military motive, that has ever been diſcovered or aſſigned, during which the *then Aſſembly* was active in preparing miſchief. That Seſſion was a ſtormy one, and ending in March, the Head Quarters were re-transferred to Montreal.

In a ſhort time our poſt at La Colle Mill, commanded by Major Handcock, of the 13th regt. was attacked by about 3000 of General Wilkinſon's army from Plattſburg, furniſhed with cannon, who were moſt gallantly repulſed with ſevere loſs in killed and wounded, by a comparative handful of men. Our loſs was about 60. A part of our flotilla aided in producing this fortunate reſult. Soon after the navigation opened

upon lake Champlain, Capt. Pring, in the naval command there, sailed from Isle aux Noix with our flotilla, then superior to that of the enemy, which had wintered in Otter Creek, where they had a ship-yard employed in constructing a force intended to surpass ours. Capt Pring in consequence applied to Sir George for some troops to accompany him, with a view of attempting to destroy this establishment, and the vessels in that Creek, whether afloat or upon the stocks, which, next to Sacket's Harbour, was an object worth a trial at some risk. As usual, the application was refused. When Capt. Pring returned from his cruize off that creek, he reported to Sir George *what might have been done by a joint attack*, and *then* he was offered assistance, but the Capt. replied, that it was *then too late*, as the enemy had taken alarm and prepared accordingly.

Sir George had the extraordinary fatality of either never attempting an active operation, or of thinking of it only when the time for practical execution was past.

As the season for action advanced, to the astonishment of every one, there was formed *at Chambly*, what is called a *Camp of Instruction*, comprising the greater part of the force above enumerated, and from which might, and ought to have been detached, a force for the attack of Sackett's Harbor; or for the reinforcement of the Niagara frontier, seriously threatened as it *then was with invasion*, in the opinion of every person

person who had eyes to see or ears to hear. Had the first mentioned object been attained, the enemy would not have ventured to cross into Upper Canada; or if Sir George was obstinately bent on letting Sacket's alone, the reinforcement of the Niagara frontier became the more imperiously necessary to secure it against the enemy's accumulating force, which had been even seen by some of our own officers in returning from captivity, but whose reports thereon were utterly disregarded.

Thus the *Camp abovesaid* furnished the means of *instruction to the enemy upon the said frontier*, by allowing them to practise against our very inferior force, but of *destruction to our troops there employed*, who were thereby doomed to combat against fearful odds, as will be seen hereafter, which is quite inexcusable, seeing we had the means of prevention in our power; for so infatuated was Sir George, that not a man was sent from Lower Canada to their aid, until the 12th of July, after our first disaster near Chippewa was known.

If it be said that there was not subsistence for an increased number of troops at that distance, I will answer by asking, why the means of conveying provisions had been neglected to be provided in due season? and further I will ask, whether the resources of a great provision country, viz. that of Long Point upon Lake Erie and its circuit, were not lost to us, and left to

be deſtroyed by the enemy, from our not ſending troops for its protection? Had a regiment been ſent there early in 1814 it would have ſecured ſubſiſtence in flour to our whole force on the Niagara line.

From the end of May, reinforcements from Great Britain, Ireland and the Weſt Indies came in; but the *accurſed Camp of inſtruction* continued, when to our aſtoniſhment in June and July, ſuch a numerous body of troops arrived from Bordeaux, that it became evident Sir George was quite bewildered thereby. Piece meal reinforcements were now diſpatched to Upper Canada, and a very large force kept below to do *ſomething*; but what it was, remained doubtful, although a buſtle of preparation began acroſs the river, which was continued for months at infinite expence.

The public mind was now buoyed up with the hope of at laſt ſeeing (that favorite object of primary importance to the protection of the Canadas) *the deſtruction of the depot at Sackett's Harbor, accompliſhed.*

The foundation of that hope reſted upon its being worthy of every effort and every riſk, which was ſtrengthened by ſeeing ſo many more troops, than our chief had aſked for, or knew how to employ. It was therefore thought, that he would have felt himſelf compelled to think of *Sackett's Harbor, and that only*, until its capture was effected.

In

In an evil hour however, and by some strange perversity of intellect, Sir George shunned that place as a pestilence, and went off with 12,000 men to Plattsburg, which some flattered themselves proceeded from a wish to whet his appetite, until the large ship at Kingston was ready; but when he was seen to return under a surfeit of his own creation, all hope was lost, and the most gloomy despair and indignation succeeded.

Upon his arrival at Plattsburgh, such a scene of military imbecibility on his part was witnessed, as is incredible. He neither evinced the smallest combination of plan, or vigor of execution; nor was any object of the expedition visible, unless through its effect, that of bringing on the destruction of *our fleet*, without making an effort to save it, or to *rescue the army* from the disgrace of being tame spectators of that destruction. Would to God that this fatal expedition could be blotted out from history. It casts an indelible stain upon our arms, (in as far as the conduct of a commander, in spite of the feelings and high spirit of the gallant troops under his orders, could do) that can never be sufficiently deplored.

As it is to become a subject of military investigation, I should have declined a previous inquiry into its demerits, had the question not been forced upon me by the intemperate zeal and fulsome compliments of his friends and addressers, who will insist upon his conduct therein being

being a master-piece of military skill, sound judgment, and great humanity. To go to trial with such pocket-fulls of signatures to addresses, procured in the manner, and by the arts which were notorious, and those from persons whereof not one in a thousand was capable of understanding the subject matter upon which he was made so peremptorily to pronounce an unqualified decision, carries, in my mind, the appearance of an attempt to brow-beat government and his court-martial into an acquittal, right or wrong, under an idea of inverting injurious consequences in this country. All this will do him injury instead of good; for truth and justice will prevail, and whatsoever the result of the trial may be, it will be quietly submitted to here, the opinion of sycophants to the contrary notwithstanding.

Captain Downie of the Royal Navy arrived from Kingston to take the command of the fleet at Isle aux Noix, a week after the Confiance, our largest vessel, was launched, and about 15 days before the fatal action. The greater part of his crew had just arrived, or were arriving, being drafts from different ships, and unknown to the officers and to each other. There was no leisure for discipline previous to the attack, as the whole time was necessarily occupied in the rigging and equipment of the fleet, to meet Sir George's importunate calls for co-operation, as the season was advancing. So hurried and defective was the equipment, that I shall give

one

one instance of it in this material point, that when the vessels were sweeping up the Lake against the wind, the joiners were at work in one of the Confiance's magazines; and the powder in a boat along-side, whilst the carpenters at the same time were busy in fixing ring-bolts, &c. for the guns and carronades, with shot lockers, &c. All this was known to Sir George, and yet his impatience at the delay of the appearance of the fleet before Plattsburgh was extreme.

Poor Downie was placed in a sad dilemma; for from circumstances whereof he had heard in respect to another quarter, he had reason to apprehend that Sir George would fish for an opportunity of throwing upon him the consequences of keeping the army idle, from an alledged want of speedy co-operation, or of furnishing an excuse for its retreat; and on the other hand, if he went prematurely into action, *his own reputation* might be ruined. After some deliberation, *his zeal* stept in to make him *risk the latter* as the less of two evils. Many must recollect the broad hints given before the day of the action, by persons belonging to Head Quarters, who remained in town, that the army was ready, but had been kept in inactivity for some days at Plattsburg, merely because the fleet, *somehow*, had not come up to co-operate. And also they will recollect, how suddenly the tune changed after the action was heard of: for then prudence and humanity stept in, (the object being

ing now gone) to effect a retreat with celerity, and which was managed without the aid of naval co-operation.

The chapter of accidents was sadly against us in the battle of the 11th Sept. 1814. The Confiance before she got into her station, had two anchors shot away, and the wind veering and baffling her, she was compelled to anchor out of her intended station with *the only one* that remained. The gallant Downie was killed at the commencement. One of our vessels got aground, and thereby became useless, whilst two thirds of our gun boats shamefully fled, towards the close of the action, when it would have been of immense importance to *wind that ship* to bring the guns of her least damaged side to bear upon the enemy. That operation was so difficult from having but one anchor that it could not be performed, as the whole fire of the enemy was at the time upon her, which compelled her to strike when in a sinking state.

In order however to convey an accurate idea upon the subject of the expedition to Plattsburg, by reasoning upon Sir George's official letter, I extract the following parts of it, viz. —"That on the 3d of Sept. our army seized the enemy's entrench'd camp at Champlain town (what a feat!) after it was abandoned by them; that on the 5th *the army* halted within 8 miles of Plattsburg; on the 6th it entered Plattsburg, after reversing the position of the enemy at Dead Creek

Creek, which they abandoned and left to be defended by the gun boats" He then describes the position of the enemy "on an elevated ridge south of the Saranac, with its redoubts &c. armed with heavy ordnance, with their flotilla, the Saratoga, Surprise, Thunderer, Preble, and 10 gun boats" (which gun boats please to remark reader, were a moment before said to be at *Dead Creek*)" *at anchor out of gun shot from the shore.*" He adds, that "he immediately communicated the circumstance to Captain Downie, who had the Confiance, Linnet, Broke, and Shannon" (Capt. Pring calls the latter the Chub and Finch) "and 12 gun boats, and requested *his co-operation* (*mark that*) and in the mean time batteries were constructed. On the morning of the 11th our flotilla was seen over the isthmus of land &c. (it seems he would not trust to his ears, in respect to the scaling of the guns for a signal as agreed upon) when immediately certain brigades were ordered to advance to force the ford of the Saranac, and escalade the enemy's works upon the heights; but scarcely had the troops forced a passage and ascended those heights, when he heard the shout of victory (here his ears appear to have been pretty sharp) from the enemy's works, in consequence of the flags of the Confiance and Linnet being struck, (they did not strike within 15 minutes of each other) and the gun boats flying." Finally he adds "this unlooked for event, depriving me of the co-operation of the fleet" (but in the name of honor and good faith why did *you not co-operate before*)

without which the further prosecution of the ſervice was become impracticable? I did not heſitate to arreſt the courſe of the troops advancing to the attack; becauſe the moſt complete ſucceſs would have been unavailing, and the poſſeſſion of the enemy's works offered no advantage to compenſate for the loſs we muſt have ſuſtained in acquiring poſſeſſion of them."

Now would it not be ſuppoſed, that all this was done in the time that Sir George was turning himſelf round from looking at the fleet, to look at his troops, and vice versa! but what muſt the aſtoniſhment be, when it is found, that the Conſiance reſiſted two hours and a half, and the Linnet 15 minutes longer! Surely the troops, whoſe Commander was ſo impatient to ſee the fleet come up, ought to have been ready to have entered the enemy's works the moment they did appear. Had they ſo entered, it is unqueſtionable that our fleet would have been victorious, or had they been permitted to enter, even when recalled, it is almoſt demonſtrable that the enemy's fleet muſt have ſurrendered, or at leaſt ours have been retaken.

There may be *ſome truth* in Sir George's official narrative, but *much* is concealed. A letter was ſent to Capt. Downie, ſtrongly urging him to come on, as the army had been long waiting for his co-operation, (ſtating as a proof of it, that it had been under arms from day light the day before, in expectation of the fleet) and cloſing for a hope that nothing but the ſtate of wind,

pre-

prevented the fleet from coming up. This laſt inſinuation conveyed more meaning than meets the ear, as if hinting that artificial delays were made. The brave Downie replied, that he required no urging to do his duty; that he ſhould be up the firſt ſhift of the wind, and make the ſignal of his approach by ſcaling his guns.

He was as good as his word.—The guns were ſcaled when he got under weigh, upon hearing which Sir George iſſued an *order* for the Troops *to cook*, inſtead of *that of inſtant co-operation.* At length, when *he ſaw the fleet*, a movement was ordered, but of courſe too late, as ſo little previous arrangement had been made for being ready to come into immediate contact with the enemy, that the troops put in motion, had a circuit of miles to make, and then when at length cloſe in with their object, were recalled the moment that the fleet fell.

As to Capt. Downie being urged by Sir George to go into action, the whole chain of circumſtances corroborate the fact, and the indiſcretion of Major Coore in furniſhing living evidence of what the hero, now no more, ſaid is not more fortunate for the cauſe of truth than concluſive thereon; beſides this, every profeſſional man knows, that no naval officer in his ſenſes, would from choice, (if left to the guidance of his own judgment) have gone into action with *a new ſhip* and *raw crew*, immediately after her equipment, without a week or ten days to diſcipline that crew, and accuſtom them to their ſtations and quarters.

Much ſtreſs is laid by Sir George and his friends upon the allegation that the enemy's fleet was out of gun ſhot from the ſhore, which is not true. But why not have entered the enemy's works, and given practical proof of the range of ſhot againſt their fleet inſtead of making conjectural aſſertions? Had *that been done*, widely different would have been the iſſue.

So thoroughly did Capt. Downie depend upon co-operation by land, that he harangued his men when going into action, to this effect, "My lads, we ſhall be immediately aſſiſted by the army aſhore—Let us ſhow them, that our part of the duty is well done." Poor fellow how he was miſtaken. In 10 minutes after he fell, and left Sir George to tell his own ſtory.—This ſpeech proved to have in the end a pernicious effect upon the crew, when the promises it conveyed, were ſeen not to be fulfilled aſhore.

It is a fact, that the American Commodore was ſo impreſſed with the idea that their works aſhore would ſtill be carried, that he did not take poſſeſſion of *our veſſels* for a long time after the action terminated; he being employed in getting *his own* out of reach from the ſhore, apprehending that their own batteries would be turned againſt them.—In the evening he expreſſed an expectation, that next morning the Britiſh colours would be ſeen flying upon the American works; and when General Macomb came off at day light, to ſay that our army had retreated in the night of the 11th leaving their ſick

sick and wounded behind, and destroying quantities of Stores and Provisions, Commodore McDonough would not credit the fact; but when it was persisted in, he cautioned Macomb to beware of a *ruse de guerre*, as the British army would either return next night, or was then proceeding by forced marches to *Sackett's Harbour*.

It is known that Macomb, notwithstanding all his puffs about our defeat, was actually sitting in gloomy despair upon a Gun, whilst our troops were advancing on the 11th, and ready to surrender the moment that the first British Soldier appeared upon the parapet; and when it was notified that they had suddenly halted, and were then on the retreat, he started up almost frantic with joy, and could hardly believe the evidence of his senses.—He had only with him about 1500 of the refuse of the American troops on the Plattsburg duty, the effectives having previously marched off for Sackett's Harbour under General Izard. To this may be added perhaps 3000 militia, chiefly collected after Sir George halted on the 6th at Plattsburg, and on which day, he might have entered their works almost without opposition, had our troops not been kept back *for a grand coup*, and behold its *finale*, ! ! !

As to saving of men by the retreat after this loss of our fleet, it is well known that twice the number were lost by desertion, that an assault would have cost us; and this he knew at the time he wrote, that "the possession of the enemy

" enemy's works offered us no advantage to " compenſate for the loſs we muſt have ſuſtain- " ed in acquiring poſſeſſion of them."

Did Sir George really believe, that we had loſt the uſe of our reaſoning faculties? was the ground upon which *the men, artillery, and ſtores at Saranac ſtood*, the object of capture? or was it not (aſſuredly it was) the *men, artillery, and ſtores, ſtanding upon that ground*! and if ſo, why were *they ſuffered to eſcape*? Surely the military character of the gallant army committed to his charge, and the manes of the gallant Downie, who periſhed under ſuch circumſtances, required ſome ſacrifices.

I wonder in what ſchool Sir George learnt the humiliating doctrine, that a Britiſh Soldier's life is more valuable to him than his military honor; and yet to juſtify ſuch a retreat, that principle muſt be aſſumed.

Did not the loſs of our fleet require a military *ſet off*? and did not that loſs abſolutely impoſe it upon Sir George as an imperious duty to furniſh that *ſet off*, by capturing the enemy's army, to prevent the effect which a retreat under ſuch circumſtances muſt produce, ornamented as he well knew it would be by American gaſconade? The miſchievous moral effect of the Plattsburg buſineſs, has been, and will be incalculable both in America and in Europe; for that will be heard of in many countries and places, where it will not be known, that *the commander alone was to*

blame

blame, and the army under him indignant on the occaſion.

Were the events of Sir George's command, and eſpecially the expeditions to Sackett's Harbor and Plattsburg to become examples for the Britiſh Army to follow; from poſſeſſing the hearts of Lions, they would ſoon be reduced to the timidity of Lambs; and the future enquiries of military men would be, *not* who had nobly done his duty, but who had avoided a battle, or who had contrived to eſcape unhurt.

It has been ſaid, that his General Orders and official letters were often compoſed with a view to deceive at a diſtance; and his Plattsburg letter furniſhes direct proof of this accuſation being correct. It is dated there the 11th of September 1814, as if written on the ſpot immediately after the naval battle, and before the degrading retreat commenced, whereas it is well known, that the letter did not go from Canada until it was carried by Mr. Secretary Brenton who ſailed from Brandy Pots on the 9th of Oct. consequently it was written in Montreal long after the date it bears.—In proof of this, read the following paragraph of that letter, " As the " troops concentrated and approached the line " of ſeparation between this Province," (is Plattsburg then in Canada) " and the United States, the American army &c." What a ſad ſlip of the pen or memory is here! But if for Plattsburg 11th September, there be ſubſtituted Montreal 21ſt Sept. or any ſubſequent day, then the blun-

der

der will be explained.—It is true that such was the celerity of his personal retreat, that on the 13th he issued an order dated at Odell-Town; but I strongly suspect that on the 11th after the action he was not in a state to write letters any where.—Another proof of its having been written at Montreal, and not at Plattsburg, is, that in the first General Order afterwards, the gun-boats were in a manner commended for effecting their retreat in safety (propably from the sympathetic feeling of the moment) whereas in the revision of that order, they are left out, but mentioned in this false dated letter as *flying*; because upon reflection, their not having *done their duty*, might lead people aside from the consideration *that he had not done his own.*

But why was the letter dated at Plattsburgh? Truly just to deceive *John Bull*, and prevent the necessity of *then* letting *him* know, how many men were lost by desertion in that memorable retreat, and what quantity of provisions and stores were destroyed in it, or during the expedition.

VERITAS.

Montreal, 23d May, 1815.

[NO. VIII.]

To the Editor of the Montreal Herald

SIR,

The enemy, as before mentioned, having been suffered to mature without counteraction, their preparations for another invasion of the Niagara line in Upper Canada, whilst Sir George was occupied with parade in the Lower Province; they crossed over about 9000 men, on the 3d of July, 1814, under General Brown, part above and part below Fort Erie, which was immediately invested and summoned; and being in a situation incapable of effectual defence, it surrendered.

After this, they descended towards Chipewa, and on the 5th, Major General Riall anticipated them by marching out from our lines, and attacking them at Street's Creek, a short distance above. After a severe conflict, our *very inferior force*, consisting at most of 1500 men, composed of a part of the Royal Scots, and King's regiment, 100th regt. a few of the Royal Artillery, and 19th Dragoons, with some militia, *was* obliged to retire to the position at Chipewa, with the loss of 500 killed and wounded. In

the former list were 6 officers, half of them militia, and in the latter, 25 officers, where 3 were militia. The Royal Scots and 100th were the chief sufferers. Lieut. Col. Gordon commanding the former, and Lieut. Col. the Marquis of Tweeddale the latter, were among the wounded. The latter officer had only joined the day before, and it is certainly a proud consideration, and a favorable omen to our country, to see men of high rank among the most forward in pursuit of military fame, and incurring all the risks and privations incident to the honorable profession of arms throughout the war. It is to be observed that the militia of the neighborhood under Lieut. Col Dickson, bore their share in the dangers and losses of the day.

General Riall finding his position turned after this action, retreated towards Fort George, into which, and Forts Niagara and Mississago, having thrown an additional force, he made a rapid flank movement, and gained the 20 mile creek, on the route *to Burlington*, thereby preserving his communications from below. This foiled the enemy in their views, which were to have proceeded by forced marches to get possession of *that post*, and insolate our force upon the Niagara line, whilst their fleet, under Commodore Chauncey, was expected to cut off our supplies and reinforcements from Kingston, as also to co-operate in ulterior proceedings against our troops so insulated. Fortunately Chauncey was not ready to sail before the end of July.

General

General Riall's attack upon the enemy, under so great a disproportion of force, as probably 5 to 1, has been censured as rash by many; but the probability is, that if he had not done so, and broke in upon their plan of operations, by that daring and unexpected manœuvre, they probably, without the aid of their fleet, would (by appearing to threaten an attack upon our lines at Chipewa) have marched to their left, and have actually cut off our communication with Burlington, as originally intended.

In this view of the subject, his attack was fortunate, and the retreat afterwards made by him, is deserving of credit, from having been effected in good order, without loss of men, artillery, stores, or baggage; so that the confidence of his troops remained unabated. Had he retreated in the first instance without fighting, the probability is, that his men would have been dispirited, as considering such a retrograde movement then premature.

It is said that General Riall was ignorant of the whole force of the enemy being united, and he doubtless considered it important in such case to cripple them, before the junction could be formed, or their fleet appear.

That officer being afterwards reinforced, advanced, and took up a position about the 20th of July, at the 12 mile Creek. The enemy, on the 15th advanced a strong column from Queenston towards Fort George, with the appearance

of eſtabliſhing themſelves in the neighbourhood, but Lieut. Col. Tucker, who was left in command of the Forts, having marched out from Fort Miſſiſſago, at the ſame time that a detachment moved from Fort George, they ſaw ſuch a reception preparing for them, as induced them to give up their intentions and retire.

A few nights before, a very neat affair upon a ſmall ſcale, took place between a party of the King's regiment, conſiſting of 32 men of the light company, under Major Evans, who had volunteered his ſervices on the occaſion, and upwards of 350 of the enemy, in which the American General Swift was killed, and the former, although at one time ſurrounded, extricated himſelf and party with much ſkill and gallantry.

On the morning of the 25th July, Lieut. Colonel Tucker with part of the garriſon of Fort George, and of the 89th Regt. drove the enemy from Lewis Town, on the ſouth ſide of the Niagara River, bringing away without loſs, ſome baggage, tents and proviſions. The ſame day General Brown began to retire from Queenſton towards Chipewa, when finding himſelf preſſed by Major General Riall, with about 1500 regulars and incorporated militia, excluſive of Indians, who had advanced upon his flank from the 12 mile creek; and conceiving that by a prompt advance againſt ſo ſmall a force, he might diſcomfit them before they could be reinforced, determined, at 6 in the evening, to attack them at Lundy's Lane, 3 miles below Chipewa. The

un-

unequal conteſt was maintained bravely for ſome time, but being overpowered, our troops were retreating, when General Drummond coming up with detachments of the Royals, King's and 89th Regts, ordered them again to advance, when the conteſt was furiouſly continued for ſome time; but on the arrival of Col. Scott's brigade, conſiſting of a part of the Royals, Kings and 103d, in all about 1200 or 1500 men, the conflict was renewed with redoubled ſpirit on both ſides, and continued until paſt midnight, when the enemy retreated precipitately to Chipewa, leaving a field piece and a howitzer, with two tumbrils in our poſſeſſion. They, at one time, had poſſeſſion of three of our field pieces, which were ſoon recovered. The enemy's loſs was about 1500, and amongſt them Generals Brown and Scott, and many field officers wounded. Ours about 900 in all.

The conduct of our regular troops was moſt gallant, and the incorporated militia emulated them, and ſuſtained a ſevere loſs. The coolneſs, intrepidity and zeal of General Drummond, could not be ſurpaſſed; for although he received a bad wound in the neck, he carefully concealed it, and remained in the field, animating the troops, until the whole was over. General Riall was ſeverely wounded and made priſoner by ſome of the enemy's horſe, which at one time had got into our rear. The conflict being in the dark, various miſtakes of friends for foes, and vice verſa, were made. Lieut. Colonel Morriſon, 89th

Lieut.

Lieut. Col. Pearſon, Inſpecting Field Officer, and Lieut. Col. Robinſon, commanding the incorporated Militia, were alſo ſeverely wounded. Lieut. Colonel Hamilton, commanding the Sedentary Militia had the good fortune not to be hurt, although his exertions did him great credit. Of inferior officers, above 40 were killed and wounded, of which 18 militia.

It is matter of great regret that the conteſt had not happened in day light, and in an open country, where ſuperiority of diſcipline could have been made available, againſt the great diſproportion of numbers, that we had to encounter, which were then above two to one, even after General Drummond, with the reinforcements came up.

On the 27th of July, the enemy retreated acroſs the Chipewa towards Fort Erie, laying waſte the country, and deſtroying the Bridges, having previouſly burnt Street's mill and the village of Saint David's. Had we poſſeſſed the means of immediate purſuit, there cannot be a doubt, that they would have been driven back to their own territory; conſequently the fatal neglect to ſend up timely reinforcements, cannot be too often deplored.

Our troops moved on with caution, and took up a poſition before Fort Erie, but the enemy had in the mean time eſtabliſhed themſelves to great advantage by abattis and other works, particularly on ſnake hill, and alſo by ſtrengthening the Fort.

On the 3d of Auguſt a well conceived plan was formed againſt Black Rock, which had it been executed as intended, the enemy at Fort Erie muſt have been reduced to the utmoſt peril, if not to a ſurrender, by reaſon of the interception or deſtruction of their ſupplies from the ſtates.

About 1000 men croſſed over to the American ſide below Snake iſland, under Lieut. Col. Tucker, but by ſome unaccountable fatality, that part of the troops who got over firſt, neglected to occupy a bridge, over which the whole were to paſs, and the enemy were thereby enabled to ſecure it by a ſmall corps of Riflemen, who threw in ſuch a fire upon our people, when they attempted to paſs, as to create a confuſion that ended in a precipitate retreat, whereby the object of the expedition was completely fruſtrated. Had it ſucceeded, an attack upon Fort Erie was intended then to have been alſo made.

An aſſault upon that poſition was however ſtill contemplated, and as a meaſure preparatory thereto, Captain Dobbs, of the Royal Navy, with a body of ſeamen, were conveyed by land, as alſo boats into Lake Erie. On the night of the 11th Auguſt, 1814, they deſcended that lake and in a maſterly ſtyle, boarded and carried the enemy's armed Schooner Somers, of 2 long 12 pounders, and the Porcupine, of one long 12, each was commanded by a Naval Lieut. and each had 35 men :—a third veſſel of same force eſcaped capture by an accident. The three were at anchor off Fort Erie, The two which we cap-

captured went down the rapids, into the rear of our troops. Our loss was Lieut. Radcliffe, of the Navy, and two seamen killed, with 4 wounded. That of the enemy was 8 in all.

It no doubt was intended that the general assault upon their works, should have speedily followed the capture of the veſſels, but circumſtances occurred to delay it until the 15th before day. At the outset, we had a fair proſpect of ſucceſs, our troops having entered their works at ſeveral points, but eſpecially having eſtabliſhed themſelves in Fort Erie, when unhappily an exploſion there took place, (whether from accident or deſign, is ſtill a conteſted point, but I think the former) which deſtroyed ſo many of our officers and men, as to occaſion the reſt to retire with precipitation.

Our loſs was moſt ſevere, being in all in killed, wounded, and priſoners, about 900; and in this loſs was compriſed ſome moſt valuable officers, amongſt whom were Col. Scott and Lieut. Col. Drummond, with others of inferior rank. The liſt of wounded officers, including priſoners, was above 30.

The loſs of the enemy muſt have been much inferior. The reſult of this attack is greatly to be lamented, as the loſs it coſt us was moſt heavy; but I can by no means conſider the implied cenſure thereon by Sir George Prevoſt, as founded upon ſound military principles. The ground thereof was, from its being a night attack; now

in

in almoſt every inſtance, of a deſperate attack upon fortified poſitions, it has been done at night, and for this reaſon, that the troops in advancing, are covered by the darkneſs from that preciſion in the fire of the enemy, which would otherwiſe be deſtructive.

There is a recent proof of this, in General Lambert's diſpatches, for he aſſigns it as one cauſe of the failure at New Orleans, that the attack, although intended to be before day, was from various cauſes delayed ſo long, that our troops could be ſeen at 200 yards diſtance from the enemy's lines as they advanced to the aſſault.

It is hardly fair in thoſe who riſk nothing either by day or night, to cenſure thoſe who do; but there is more propriety in the remark, that as the 82d was not far off, and the 6th regt. following in ſucceſſion, theſe circumſtances furniſhed good reaſon for delaying the attack until their arrival. There is however in oppoſition to that, the emulation and zeal of thoſe brave men, who ſealed their opinions with their lives upon the occaſion.

The wounds of General Brown were ſuch that he reſigned the command to General Gaines, for ſome time, but was able to reſume it again in September. The enemy's fleet was ſuperior to ours during the months of Auguſt, September, and half of October, 1814; during which times Sir James Yeo remained at Kingſton, waiting for the completion of our 3 decker, the St. Lawrence.

Commodore Chauncey in this interval, profited little by his command of the lake, nor did any thing of much moment happen at Fort Erie, during Brown's temporary retirement.

The remaining operations of the laſt campaign, I ſhall defer to my next.

I find that I am aſſailed by a writer in the Courant, with a torrent of ſcurrilous abuſe, which exceeds the oratory of Billingsgate, or even that of the moſt violent American Newspaper. To ſuch democratic ſlang I ſhall make no reply, (it being preciſely of the like tenor as was uttered in the Aſſembly of Upper Canada by Wilcocks and others, who afterwards went over to the enemy) but content myſelf with obſerving, that the ſcope and object of his doctrine, ſeems to be to maintain, that in no poſſible caſe, can an extraordinary power be exerciſed *by the King's Repreſentative* for the preſervation of the Province.

That on the eve of, or pending an invaſion, although *he* ſhould discover that the diſaffected are labouring by machinations, both open and concealed, to palsy the means of defence, and feel conviction that they muſt thereby ſucceed in their views, *he even then* muſt ſtill confine *himſelf* to the ſame line of proceeding, as would be applicable to the ordinary courſe of events, in times of peace and tranquility; and rather than apply an extraordinary remedy, although with a certainty of its proving effectual for the

ſecurity

ſecurity of the Province committed to his charge, muſt quietly ſubmit to the proſpect of certain eventual conqueſt, and to the immediate ſtarvation of his troops.

Now this doctrine I deny, and maintain, that it merits the execration of every good ſubject, however diſguiſed under the maſk of an affected regard for conſtitutional forms.

VERITAS.

Montreal, 31ſt May, 1815.

(NO. IX.)

To the Editor of the Montreal Herald

SIR,

After our unfortunate attempt upon the enemy's position at Fort Erie, little was done there on either side for some time, excepting reciprocal attacks upon pickets and occasional cannonading, which were productive of a considerable loss of lives.

On the 17th of September, 1814, after General Brown had resumed the command, the enemy sallied out with about 5000 men, and made a bold attempt upon our batteries, wherein they succeeded by carrying them in the first instance, and spiking or disabling the guns; but our troops most gallantly retook them at the point of the bayonet, in which recapture part of the 82d, under Major Proctor, and of the 6th, under Major Taylor, greatly distinguished themselves.

The attack by the enemy was made under a kind of surprise, which was facilitated by the very bad state of the weather, that enabled them to approach unperceived, close to the right of our position, and capture a number of De Watteville's

regt.

regt. there on duty. The loſs on both sides was very severe. Curs in killed, wounded and prisoners, exceeded 600. Lieut. Cols. Fiſher, Pearson, and Gordon, were severely wounded, and the latter afterwards died of his wounds. The enemy had also a number of their best officers killed and wounded.

This sortie of the enemy is the more remarkable, as having been a departure from their usual course, which was the Indian mode of warfare, with additional safe guards. The Indians make a point of never risking their persons, where it can be avoided, but look out for, and avail themselves of the cover of trees and other natural objects, which can enable them to kill the enemy, without danger to themselves. The American troops are alike careful of their persons in action, and use the same precautions wherever practicable, with the addition of artificial covering, by cutting down trees, and forming abattis, &c.

Our troops on the contrary, are too apt to despise those precautions, and to incur an exceſs of perſonal risk, as if they considered it derogatory in a ſoldier to go behind a tree or other cover. There can be no stronger proof of the enemy's want of confidence in themselves, and consequent repugance to meet our troops on ground where the bayonet could be uſed, than their not following our handfuls of men to any diſtance, after their landing near Fort George,

in

in 1813; their allowing us to retreat from the battle at Street's Creek, without attempting to purſue; their witneſſing our diſgraceful retreat at Plattsburg, without one effort to give it the colouring falſely pretended by General Macomb, of his having repulſed our attack, inſtead of the mortifying fact, that the diſgrace aroſe entirely from the order given by Sir George Prevoſt, who prevented 12000 men from doing what any 3000 of them could have effected. And finally, near New-Orleans, where the American troops, from being completely under cover, ſuſtained no loſs, whilſt ours were wholly expoſed, and mowed down by hundreds at a time; yet not a man moved out of their lines to follow up our repulſe. In caſes where no perſonal danger is incurred, it requires no other courage, than to ſtand until perſonal ſafety be aſcertained.

It is an extraordinary circumſtance, that in the late war, we neglected to adapt our tactics to the enemy we had to deal with, and the country we had to act in; and it is alike extraordinary, that of that arm of our military force beſt qualified for American warfare, viz. Riflemen and Light Infantry, not a battalion of either was ſent to Canada, although common ſenſe, and the experience of the former American war, ought to have ſuggeſted the propriety and expediency of the meaſure.

To what is this to be aſcribed? Is it to the neglect of Sir George to make a requiſition for ſuch troops? or is it, that in wiſhing to puff off his own

own merits, he deceived Government into a belief, that such were unnecessary, as if the militia had been quite sufficient to supply their place. Whatsoever the cause, the effect has been the loss of a great number of valuable lives, which with the numerous other lamentable neglects of that Commander, contributed to give the enemy advantages and pretexts for exultation, which otherwise could never have existed.

The rains in September were constant and excessive, which acting upon the swampy nature of the ground, where part of our troops were obliged to be placed near Fort Erie, and in conjunction with the privations to which they were subjected, made them so sickly, as to render it a point of prudence and expediency, after the loss of our heavy cannon, to fall back upon Chipewa, which was done gradually, without interruption from the enemy.

During this time, the large division of the enemy, under General Izard, who had moved from Plattsburg shortly before Sir George's memorable expedition thither, as if in thorough contempt of him, by presuming upon his military incapacity, (indeed it is alike incomprehensible, why Izard moved off, or why Sir George after he did move, did nothing against the miserable remnant of his force that he left behind under Macomb) had arrived at Sacket's Harbour, when finding that they still had the command of Lake Ontario, that division was embarked and sent

sent in vessels and craft a considerable distance up, and then disembarking on the south side, the troops marched by land to Buffalo, to join Gen. Brown.

At one time, it was reported, that they had landed on the British side at 12 mile creek, which indeed would have been most serious: General Brown emboldened by the approach of this force, drew nearer to our position at Chipewa, and when the junction was effected, an attempt was made to turn our right, in which they failed, after sustaining considerable loss. It is probable that the attempt would have been renewed, but for the reported approach of our fleet, which occasioned them to retreat with precipitation on the 19th of Oct. 1814, to Fort Erie, from which they finally retired on the 5th of Nov. to their own side, after destroying the fort and the other works; having previously sent over their artillery and stores, with part of their troops and militia, and thus ending that campaign.

After our ship the St. Lawrence of 100 guns was launched and fitted at Kingston, our fleet sailed from thence on the 16th of October with a reinforcement of troops and stores for Niagara, where they arrived soon after the Americans had retreated. Commodore Chauncey when he found that the 3 decker was ready, retired to Sacket's Harbour, and made no attempt to impede the contemplated relief to our troops.

It has been regretted, that our fleet did not carry up a sufficient force at once, to have enabled

bled General Drummond to have immediately followed up the enemy after their retreat, and in which case a great part of them, with their cannon and stores, would probably have been captured. In opposition to this, it has been maintained, and I think with truth, that it would have been unpardonable in Sir James Yeo to have taken on board such a number of troops, as to have incapacitated his squadron from fighting the enemy to advantage, in the battle that it was expected Commodore Chauncey would risk, to endeavor to defeat the object we had in view. Our fleet returned, and made a second trip from Kingston to Niagara early in Nov. but by this time the enemy had retired to their own side.

In the year 1814, the enemy made several incursions into the upper part of Upper Canada, for the express purpose of destroying private property, for on the 15th of May, a detachment of their army under Colonel Campbell, landed at Long Point on Lake Erie, pillaged and laid waste the adjacent country, burnt the village of Dover, with all the mills, stores, distilleries, and dwelling houses in the vicinity, carried away such property as was portable, and killed the cattle within their reach. The loss, by such destruction and pillage, was estimated at fifty thousand dollars.

On the 16th of August, some American troops and Indians in their service from Detroit, sur-

 prised

prised the settlement of Port Talbot, where they committed the most atrocious acts of violence, leaving upwards of 230 men, women and children, in a state of nakedneſs and want.

On the 20th September, a second excursion was made by the American garrison of Detroit, spreading fire and pillage through one of the settlements in the Western District of Upper Canada, whereby 27 families were reduced to misery. Early in November, same year, General M'Arthur with a large body of mounted Kentuckians and Indians, made a rapid march through the weſtern and part of London Districts in that Province, burning the mills, deſtroying the provisions, and living upon the Inhabitants.

Now, is it possible to conceive, that all those, and former acts of conflagration and pillage could have happened without orders from the American Govt. and yet if we had retaliated upon this principle in the Cheſapeake or elſewhere, (which was completely in our power to have done) what an outcry would have been raised by Mr. Madiſon, and re-echoed by the oppoſition in the Imperial Parliament, who on finding themſelves beat from their grounds of cenſure againſt our Government and officers for the deſtruction of the public buildings at Waſhington, when proved to have been merely retaliatory, then took up a new poſition equally untenable, viz. that it would have been *magnanimous not to have followed the example of the Americans in their conduct at York and Newark.* Now

Now in common ſenſe, what does ſuch doctrine mean? Do theſe mock patriots reſerve all their ſympathies for the enemies of their country, and regard with callous indifference, the ſufferings of their fellow ſubjects? are the latter not entitled to protection and conſideration, and as means of that protection, was it not incumbent upon our officers, and a point of juſtice, to turn againſt the enemy their own weapons, and thereby make them feel the conſequences of their own enormity of conduct, with a view to prevent their repeating the like in future?

It is very *magnanimous to be ſure* to ſpeak with cold blooded indifference about the infliction of ruin upon friends at the diſtance of 3,000 miles, by fire and devaſtation in the moſt aggravated ſhapes; but I will venture to ſay, that if Mr. Whitbread's brewery and his princely manſion, with all their contents, had been at York or Newark, and ſhared the fate of the buildings there conſigned to the flames by the enemy, we ſhould never have heard of his lectures upon *the virtue of magnanimity*.

Thoſe oppoſitioniſts are not more callous to the ſufferings of our fellow ſubjects, than of our allies. What concern and reprobation have they not expreſſed at the pretended cruelties exerciſed by the Indians in our intereſt, againſt their enemies: but which of them has ever been heard to commiſerate the fate of thoſe poor creatures who were murdered in cold blood, to the ſouth-

ward, by the remorseleſs Jackſon and Coffee, as their own diſpatches prove; or at the ſyſtematic burning and deſtroying of Indian towns and corn fields to the northward, by the American troops and militia.

Has any of them ever lifted up his voice in Parliament, againſt the ſcandalous land pillage and other vexations and injuſtice practiſed againſt the Indians by the Americans, and to which they are re-conſigned, by its having been omitted to be ſtipulated in the late treaty of peace, that neither Great Britain nor the United States, ſhould have garriſons or cuſtom houſes within the Indian territory; unleſs it be underſtood, that exemption therefrom makes part of the rights to which the natives were intitled in 1811; and yet with all theſe outrages and neglects ſtaring them in the face, we find them runing over the world in ſearch of adventures or objects, whereon to exerciſe their tender feelings, in the cauſe of humanity.—nay, Mr. Whitbread ſeems tremblingly alive with apprehenſion that Great Britain may re-interfere to dethrone the Corſican, and does his utmoſt to ſave *that monſter* from the attack of the Allied powers, all of whom he libels in the moſt groſs and unmeaſured language. Yet ſuch is modern patriotism!

After the campaign of 1814 cloſed, General Drummond and Sir James Yeo came down to Montreal, to confer with Sir George Prevoſt upon

upon the plan of operations for the next year: whatsoever that plan was, is now not material to be known, but much valuable time was lost in point of preparation, by hesitating about whether to build veſſels at Turkey point, on Lake Erie, or on Lake Huron. The latter was at last decided upon, as it ought to have been at first; but if report be true, Sir George was blameleſs in this delay. Had he been half as anxious to prevent the loſs of our lake Erie fleet, as it is said, he afterwards was to create a new one upon Lake Huron, (which certainly was the only secure situation to build after that loſs) there never could have existed a queſtion upon the subject, and all the misfortunes of the right division of our army would have been avoided.

Before however the result of the incredible expence incurred in winter 1814, could be known (and which expence, as also the similar excessive expenditure from winter 1813 onwards, were rendered neceſſary alone by the unpardonable preceding neglects) the news of peace very unexpectedly arrived, and put a stop to further naval and military preparations. Some time after Sir George was ſuperseded and recalled, in a manner conveying the most pointed marks of the disapprobation of his Majesty's Government. The peace is negatively glorious to us, in so far as that the enemy have not gained any one point for which they went to war, and have lost valuable indulgencies, that we had granted them in former treaties; yet I cannot but consider the

the terms of the treaty *unsatisfactory*, in not containing some provision for *the future security of the Canadas*, and *dishonorable*, in not providing for *the independence and protection of our Indian Allies*.

Although not coming within the scope of my plan at the onset, yet I cannot pass without observation, the species of deception, by which the American Naval service has obtained a degree of celebrity, to which it is not entitled in point of fact. During the peace subsequent to the American revolution, political differences of opinion amongst their parties, prevented their building line of battle ships with the timber which was provided for that purpose; but the federal party then in power, as a trick upon the democrats, who were out, worked up that timber into ships which they called frigates, by reason of not having two complete gun-decks; but boasted of their being in effect 74's in disguise, which was perfectly true. It has however since been found more convenient for their national vanity, to play off the trick upon us; and dropping the appellation of 74's in disguise, to call them plain 44 gun frigates. By thus disguising their real strength, and cautiously in all their official accounts, speaking of them as frigates, and also concealing their weight of metal, and number of men, they have imposed upon the world, or at least the non-professional part of it, by inducing them to believe, that in their combats with us, it was frigates of 44 guns only against those of 38.

The

The fallacy of this will be manifeſt from the following ſtatements: the Preſident, Conſtitution, and United States, rated at 44 guns, are each 1630 tons, and carry 56 guns, of the following calibres, with each 480 to 500 picked men, viz:

32 long 24 pounders discharging 768 lbs of ball,
2 do 18 do do 36 - -
22 32lbs. carronades do 704 - (I am uncertain if they are not 42lb. carronades)

56 guns excluſive of howitzers in the top 1508 lbs.—Now our 38 gun frigates with which they have had to combat, and which they captured, viz: Guerriere, Macedonian and Java, were each under 1000 tons, and the compliment of each 320 men and boys; the latter ſhip having ſupernumeraries going to the Eaſt Indies, had on board 377 men and boys. They each carried 49 guns of the following description:

28 long	18 prs.	diſcharging	504lbs. of ball,
2 do	9 do	do	18 ———
16 car'ds.	32 do	do	512 ———
2 do	12 do	do	94 ———
1 braſs gun			6 ———
49 guns		do	1064 ———

It is proper to remark, that the Dragon, the largeſt 74 in the Britiſh Navy, is two feet ſhorter but two feet broader than the American 44's. Her tonnage is 1798 and their's 1630. The average tonnage of 12 British 74's is only 1628, being the ſame as the ſaid 44's. Upon the whole therefore, it is evident, that what they have been puffing off to the world as equal com-

bat,

bat, has been at least as 6 to 4; and if their over-proportion of able or professional seamen, to what our ships carry, be considered, the difference is still greater, perhaps two to one.

In the sloops of war, there was the like disproportion, as for instance, the American sloop Hornet carried 18 carronades of 32 lbs. 4 long 9 and 2 long 6 pounders, with 165 picked men —the British sloop or brig Peacock, had 16 carronades of 24lbs. and 2 long 9's. with 122 men and boys.

The same cheat, or rather a much greater, is in progress with the 76's lately built, which are to carry 800 or 900 men each, and to discharge the following broadsides, viz:

16 long	42 prs. lower deck	672 lbs.
16 do	24 do. upper deck	384.
2 do	24 do. qr. deck	48.
10 car'ds	42 do. dk. forecastle	420.
4 do	24 do. poop	96.
48 guns of a side,	in all	1620 lbs.

A British ship of 3 decks, rated at 98, carries 112 guns, discharging a broadside of

14 long	32 lower deck	448 lbs.
14 do	24 middle do	336, some have 15 on this deck.
14 do	12 upper do	168.
2 do	18 } qr. deck	36.
7 car'ds	32 } and forecastle	224.
4 do	24 poop	96.
55 guns of a side, in all		1308 lbs. and 750 men.

The

The Americans have also lately built a description of what they call frigates, to be rated 48 guns and to carry 62 guns each with 600 men,

Viz: 34 long 32 pounders,
4 do 24 do
24 car'ds 42 do

The length of their gun-deck is above 180 feet.

It is to be regretted, that in part we have sanctioned this deception, which the Americans have superlatively encreased. It was common in our official accounts of battles with the French to state our ships according to their rate in the Navy, and the captured enemy at the actual number of guns he carried; and thus the Americans have had the modesty to say, but most falsely, that they have captured British men of war at sea of equal force, which the French never could. Now the fact is, that neither have captured our ships of equal force, and it is alike true, that we never conquered a French ship of of the like actual superiority to ours, as the American ships which we engaged really poſſeſſed in intrinsic force.

In the only actions we have had with American ships of war, wherein the respective force was nearly alike, (for I ſhall not notice the real difference of strength, it being on the side of the enemy) viz: the Shannon and Chesapeake frigates, and Pelican and Argus sloops; both were taken in a style, and in a space of which perhaps there is no naval precedent. It is a pity that every thing could not be reduced to arithmetical

metical calculation. For when such can be done, the deception ceases.

To prevent, therefore, imposition upon the world, it should be laid down as an invariable rule in all naval actions, to state the actual number, size, and description of guns carried on both sides, with the real number of men on board at the time, and how many thereof are rated able seamen; were this truly done, there would be an end of gasconade, and an invariable criterion established for ascertaining the real strength of nerves. Indeed no ship should be rated lower than what she carries.

A British man of war's crew is composed of 4 classes, viz: able seamen, ordinary seamen, landsmen, including boys and marines; if a ship has a fourth of her crew rated able, she is considered to be well manned, whereas an American ship of war, for their having but few in number to man, has half her crew or more, regularly bred seamen. By the capture of the President and Chesapeake, the real state of their force and equipment will have been discovered, and evince more especially as to the former, her wonderful over proportion of force to her pretended rate.

It is a fact that speaks volumes to the credit of our Navy, that in no instance have our men of war declined the combat against equal numbers whatsoever the inequality of force, nor surrendered before they were in a sinking state; where-

whereas I know of no case where an American ship of war sought for an action, with one of ours of superior force ; but it is upon record that the redoubtable Commodore Rogers, in the President, run sixty hours in the North Sea, from the Alexandria frigate, magnifying her into a line of battle ship, and at the commencement of the war, he was so shy of the Belvidera, as to let her escape, altho' he had some other American frigates astern.

The following has been handed to me as being a more correct statement of the action at Lundy's Lane, and previous movements, than the abstract thereof given by me, and it being stated to be the result of personal observation. I give it in the writer's own words, altho' in detail somewhat beyond the space that I had allotted to myself for this number.

" General Brown retired from Queenston on Sunday, the 24th of July, 1814; intelligence of which reaching the division under General Riall, at the 12 mile Creek, the Glengary light infantry, and Incorporated Militia only, marched that night about eleven o'clock, for Lundy's Lane, where they arrived next morning about 7 o'clock, in all about 700 men ; the Glengary's, commanded by Lieut. Col. Batterſby, the Militia by Lieut Col. Robinson, and the whole under Lieut. Col. Pearson, Inspecting Field Officer.

General Brown, in the course of the afternoon of the 15th, received intelligence of their weakness

weakneſs, and General Scott with about 1600 men, infantry and dragoons, with ſeveral field pieces, came out from Chippewa about 6 o'clock to attack them.

Moſt fortunately General Drummond had that morning landed from York with the 89th regt. and with that corps, and detachments of the Royal Scots and King's regt. drawn from the forts, in all about 800 men ; immediately marched towards Chippewa. The detachment on the south bank of the River Niagara, consisting of the 41ſt regt. after capturing the Poſt at Lewiston was croſſed to our own ſhore, and returned to the forts, or remained at Queenſton, the light company excepted.

The troops from Fort George, after dining at Queenſton between 4 and 5 in the afternoon, continued their march with Gen. Drummond at their head, and had got within half a mile of Lundy's lane, when they received intelligence that the American army were advancing.—Our Troops were halted and joined by the Incorporated Militia, when General Drummond and ſtaff rode in advance to reconnoitre. The Glengaries had remained at the Lane ; orders were immediately ſent for our troops to advance, and the General had barely time to take a poſition when both his flanks were engaged. Veritas ſays, The unequal conteſt was continued bravely for ſome time, but being overpowered, the troops were retreating &c. This would lead to

a belief that at one time we had been beaten, but which was not the case at any one moment, nor did we yield them one foot of ground. A little before dusk the enemy received strong reinforcements, when the action became general, and though our left was very hard pressed, it never was overpowered. About 400 of the enemy made a detour along the river on our left, and gained the Niagara road in our rear, and it was then that they took General Riall and most of our prisoners.

The remainder of our Troops at the 12 mile creek were ordered to march at 3 that morning, and were under arms at that hour, but by some fatality the order was countermanded, and they did not move till past 12 o'clock.—Then when General Riall first learnt that the enemy were advancing, he sent an officer to meet Col. Scott of the 103d, with orders to retire on Queenston. This order reached him about 3 miles from the field a short time before the action began, and before the Colonel received a counter order, he had made in pursuance of the first order a retrogade movement of nearly 4 miles, so that it was past 9 o'clock before he and his men could come up, who were then a good deal blown, and then it was so dark, that but a partial advantage of their arrival could be taken.—Thus the action was chiefly fought by the troops originally engaged."

It would be very satisfactory to me, that this statement should prove more correct than the

other ; but I certainly did underſtand, and I am not ſingular in ſo doing, that a part of our troops overpowered by numbers, had at one time commenced a retreat, but moſt gallantly renewed the combat.

I hoped to have cloſed the military part of my narrative in this number, but find that I muſt defer it to my next. VERITAS.

Montreal, 7th June 1815.

(NO. X.)

To the Editor of the Montreal Herald

SIR,

Having come to the close of my narrative of Sir George's military administration, it only remains to make a short recapitulation with a few remarks.

To the unprejudiced it will be evident from the facts adduced, that at the commencement of the late war, although so long threatened, he had adopted no measure for procuring early, or indeed any information upon the subject; and the whole of its progress was marked by such a deficiency of intelligence as almost on every occasion to demonstrate, that he was ignorant of the enemy, and without any plan of operations other than a disheartening defensive system, entirely dependent upon the developement of their movements, without attempt at circumvention or counteraction.

That neither Sir George nor his pretended friends, had any agency in the example which drew forth the services of the militia of the Lower Province, or in quelling the disturbances which were produced by the execution of his own militia act. That

That to General Brock's zeal and energy, left as he was without orders, along with other causes independent of Sir George, the preservation of Upper Canada in the first instance, and of Lower Canada as a consequence, are mainly to be ascribed.

That at the beginning of the war we had a great superiority in vessels on Lakes Ontario and Erie, which the crew of a sloop of war in 1812 would have secured to us; but which superiority he allowed by inaction and neglect to be wrested from us by means of the building of vessels that could have been prevented, and especially by suffering the formation of the naval establishment at Sackett's Harbor, which might have been destroyed.

That the loss of our fleet upon Lake Erie, arose from a like neglect of the Presque Isle establishment, and from a great deficiency in the equipment and crews of our vessels under the command of Captain Barclay, which it was the duty of Sir George, who then directed both services, to have prevented.

That in 1813, when he made an attack upon Sackett's Harbour, it was, when on the point of surrender, abandoned in a manner disreputable to our military character.

That by some strange fatality, the attempt was never afterwards renewed, although it was evident to every man of common understanding acquainted

acquainted with the country, that the result of the war on the side of Canada, must depend upon the command of the Lakes; and that such command could not be maintained, but at an intolerable expence, and then very precariously, unless the establishment at Sackett's harbour could be destroyed.

That inaction and neglect at the outset, laid the foundation of a necessity for a most lavish expenditure in the progress of the war, and especially in the last stage of it, to the extent of many millions sterling, whereby the government and the nation became dissatisfied, and finally were so completely disappointed in their expectations from the very extensive military and other resources placed under the direction of Sir George, as to engender a general wish for peace on almost any terms; and therefore whatsoever there may be in the conditions of peace, which are not what they would or ought to have been under different circumstances, may very fairly be ascribed to Sir George's mismanagement of those resources, and general incapacity for the high situation he held.

That the loss of our fleet upon Lake Champlain, unquestionably in part proceeded from a premature attack by its Commander, Capt. Downie, and which attack would not have been made when it was, had he not been urged thereto; or even if not urged in express terms, certainly not without a confidence in a joint attack or co-

operation on the part of the army, but no such attack or co-operation took place.

The loss however of that fleet, mortifying as it was, is trifling, when compared with the humiliation resulting from the fatal expedition to Plattsburgh, and the disgraceful retreat therefrom without fighting; because Sir George thereby cast a stain upon our well earned military renown, which has had a most pernicious moral effect at a distance, viewed as it has been through American misrepresentation, and consequently exaggerated into a military defeat, instead of being considered as it really was, owing to the gross fault of the commander alone, in direct opposition to the wishes and feelings of almost every officer and soldier in his army.

And what adds to the misfortune, is, that no reasoning or explanation can ever effectually eradicate the false impression made by that lamentable retreat, in which our gallant troops were such indignant actors, and which impression may be the cause of bringing about another war upon the part of the United States, at an earlier period then would have been the case, had the fleet been saved and the works of Plattsburg carried.

The candid part of the American officers, ridicule Sir George's conduct at Sackett's Harbour and Plattsburg, although benefiting thereby as much as we can do, who are such heavy sufferers therefrom.

I shall only add that the severe losses sustained by our troops in the hard fought campaign of 1814 on the Niagara line, arose from the obstinate neglect of Sir George to furnish reinforcements to that part of the army on the opening of the navigation, notwithstanding the manifest preparations of the enemy to make their real attack in that quarter.

Moreover I am informed, that Sir Geoge and General Sheaffe, when at York in winter 1812, were of opinion, that Upper Canada could not be defended with the then means; in which opinion a gentleman in high civil situation there joined;—so that it may be truly said, both Provinces were preserved by a kind of miracle in aid of the exertions of others, in spite of the opinions, incapacity, and egregious blunders of the Commander of the forces, and against his intentions of evacuating the country beyond Kingston, and General Sheaffe's wish for a premature abandonment of Fort Erie.

It was my intention to have given also a sketch of Sir George's civil administration, but reflecting that it has been already so ably depicted, by NERVA, in his admirably written allegory, I shall, for the present not prosecute that intention.

VERITAS.

Montreal, 7th June 1815.

FINIS.